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AFFORDABLE HOUSING FOR THE 
1990's 
Harold A. McDougall* 
National housing policy begins with the New Deal,1 perhaps 
because the Depression was the first time that poor housing and 
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Senior Research Specialist on Housing in the Economics Division of the Congressional 
Research Service, and of his colleagues Grace Milgram, Barbara Miles, Jane Gravelle, 
and Charles Welborn, whose work has greatly influenced my own thinking. Of course, all 
the mistakes are mine. 
1. The New Deal was ushered in at a time when the Depression had pushed the 
number of unemployed to 15 million people. NATIONAL Ass'N OF HOME BUILDERS, Hous-
ING AMERICA-THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 30 (1985) [hereinafter NAHB]. 
Before the New Deal, it is difficult to discern any coordinated national housing policy. 
At the state and local level, housing policy was primarily a subset of community develop-
ment policy. Organizations such as the New York Society for Improving the Conditions 
of the Poor and individuals such as Jacob Riis brought the conditions of tenement dwell-
ers to public attention before the turn of the century. Welborn, Housing and Commu-
nity Development, in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HOUSE 
COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., HOUSING-A READER 
151, 151-52 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter Hous1NG-A READER]. 
At the national level, federal activity included an 1892 study of slum conditions in 
cities with populations over 200,000; a substantial public housing effort to provide shelter 
for shipyard and defense plant workers during World War I (all of the produced units 
were· sold to the private sector at the close of the war); and the construction by the 
Hoover administration's Reconstruction Finance Corporation of a 1573-unit low income 
apartment complex called "Knickerbocker Village" in New York City on the eve of the 
New Deal. D. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES 260-61 (2d ed. 1984). The Hoover 
administration also sponsored the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 
Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1430, 1430b-1440, 1442-1449 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), shoring up savings and loan institutions that specialized in 
financing home mortgages for the middle class. See D. JUDD, supra, at 129. 
The New Deal approach to low income housing was crafted out of the work of the 
Housing Division of the Public Works Administration (PWA) (using low interest federal 
loans to induce the private sector to engage in renovation, slum clearance, and construc-
tion of low income housing) and the United States Emergency Housing Corporation 
(USEHC) (directly financing and constructing low income housing beginning in 1933, 
then working through locally chartered public housing authorities to avoid federal exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain). Id. at 261-62. The United States Housing Act of 
1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437n 
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)), designed to build low income housing and clear slums through 
a combination of federal funding, local public housing authority (LPHA) sponsorship, 
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homelessness hit mainstream people in large numbers. The dis-
ruption of mortgage lending and a rash of mortgage foreclosures 
short-circuited home ownership for the middle class.2 Lower in-
come renters lived in substandard housing characterized by 
crowding, lack of private toilet facilities, lack of running water, 
and the need for major repairs. 3 
The New Deal erected an entire financial system to facilitate 
home ownership for Americans who could not otherwise afford 
it,• and a system of public housing for those who could not af-
and private enterprise, was the cornerstone of New Deal housing policy for the poor. D. 
Juno, supra, at 262. Between 1937 and 1945, the United States Housing Administration, 
created by the 1937 Act, and its successor, the Federal Public Housing Authority, con-
structed almost 170,000 units of low income public housing. Id. at 264. The New Deal 
approach to middle income housing is set forth infra note 4. 
2. See NAHB, supra note 1, at 30 (more than 1.5 million home mortgage foreclosures 
and defaults). 
3. In 1940, crowding was defined as more than 1.5 persons per room. Milgram, The 
Rationale for Assisted Housing, in HousING-A READER, supra note 1, at 98, 99. 
4. Federal policy for protecting and then promoting middle class housing centered on 
the insulation of home mortgage financing from commercial lending. Miles, Housing Fi-
nance: Development and Evolution in Mortgage Markets, in HOUSING-A READER, 
supra note 1, at 45, 48. Although the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was 
set up to protect investments in commercial banks, and the Federal Reserve Board was 
set up to stabilize the entire financial system, the role of savings and loan institutions 
(S & L's) in home mortgage financing was sheltered by a special subsystem, under the 
general stewardship of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB was 
created by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1430, 1430b-1440, 1442-1449 (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986)), and had power to both fund and regulate the activities of the S & L's. See Miles, 
supra, at 48. 
The FHLBB, initiated not by Roosevelt but by Hoover, was initially capitalized at 
$125 million. This sum financed the establishment of the FHLBB and twelve regional 
ban/cs as a reserve system for the S & L's. NAHB, supra note 1, at 30. Federally 
chartered S & L's received significant capital incentives and tax deductions in exchange 
for their pledge to make home mortgage lending a substantial part of their portfolio. Id.; 
see Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1461-1462, 1464-1466a, 1468 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). 
The New Deal broadened and strengthened this financial system by adding insurance 
for S & L depositors, whose deposits gave S & L's the funds needed to engage in mort-
gage lending. This insurance fund, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC), was established by the National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, tit. IV, 
§§ 401-407, 48 Stat. 1246, 1255-61 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730 (1982 & 
Supp. IV 1986)). The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), established by the Na-
tional Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, tit. I, §§ 1-5, 48 Stat. 1246, 1246-47 (1934) (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703, 1705 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), promoted and insured 
long-term, low interest home mortgages, steering home mortgage finance away from the 
short-term balloon note instruments that had precipitated a rash of foreclosures in the 
opening days of the stock market crash. Miles, supra, at 48. The Federal National Mort-
gage Association (FNMA), established in 1938 by the FHA pursuant to its delegated 
authority under the 1934 Act, acted as a "purchaser of, and thus a guaranteed source of 
funds for, any FHA-insured loan made by private lenders." Id. at 48. This basic system 
was significantly modified in 1944 when the Veterans' Administration guaranteed no-
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ford to own their own home despite federal intervention.6 The 
New Deal's housing agenda was mixed with other agendas, how-
ever-the need for jobs, the need to shore up financial institu-
tions, and the need to dramatically upgrade the housing stock. 
In the fifty years since then, these other agendas have either 
been met, more efficient techniques have been identified to 
achieve them, or the agendas have simply been discarded. With-
out the support of other goals, home ownership for the middle 
class and subsidized housing for the poor have proven increas-
ingly difficult to justify-and fund-in an age of government fis-
cal austerity. 
Today's housing problems do not seem as extreme as those of 
the Depression era,6 but the cause remains the same-the gap 
between what people earn and what it costs to purchase or rent 
housing. Substandard housing is no longer as widespread as it 
was during the first years of the Depression; rather, the lack of 
affordable housing is the central problem for housing policy to-
day. 7 The lack of affordable housing has also ominously climbed 
the socioeconomic ladder,8 and the gap between consumer in-
come and housing cost is constantly widening. At the same time, 
the federal government's involvement in housing has been de-
creasing ever since the New Deal. 
Although federal assistance to middle class home ownership 
and lower income rental housing has been decreasing for de-
cades, it is the Reagan administration that has been most closely 
associated with taking the federal government out of the housing 
business. As one of its key initiatives, the Reagan administration 
deregulated the savings and loan institutions that were the cor-
down payment loans made by mortgage lenders to veterans. NAHB. supra note 1, at 32; 
Miles, supra, at 48. 
5. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1437-1437n (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see infra notes 78-92 and accompanying 
text. 
6. Today's standards of housing habitability are higher than those of the 1940's. For 
housing to be considered habitable today, it must include hot as well as cold running 
water, be in a better condition of repair and less crowded (one person per room rather 
than 1.5 persons per room). By these higher standards, 5.3 million households in 1983 
occupied housing that was substandard due to plumbing or state of repair, and 1.5 mil-
lion additional households occupied housing that was substandard due to overcrowding. 
Milgram, supra note 3, at 99-100. The number of homeless persons has been estimated 
at between 250,000 and 3,000,000 people. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
7. Approximately 9.7 million households paid more than 30% of their income for 
shelter that was not crowded or otherwise substandard. Milgram, supra note 3, at 101. 
8. The percentage of income spent on housing has risen steadily since World War II 
for all families regardless of income. Id. at 100-01. In 1950, 30.8% of renters paid over 
25% of their income in rent. In 1980, 32.7% of such households paid at least 35% of 
their income in rent. Moreover, 51.6% had rent-income ratios greater than 1:4. Id. 
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nerstone of federal housing policy for the middle class since 
World War II. The administration has also massively cut various 
subsidized housing programs aimed at low and moderate income 
groups. As a result, the housing industry is depressed, while 
many middle income persons cannot afford to own their own 
homes and some lower income persons cannot afford housing at 
all.9 -
This Article examines the history of national housing policy 
and the factors that will influence its future. Part I discusses the 
role of capital costs in influencing housing policy. Part II sum-
marizes the changes that have occurred in housing policy in the 
last fifty years. Part III studies how local- and state-level inst~-
tutions have reacted to these changes. Finally, Part IV predicts 
the future of national housing policy, focusing particularly on lo-
cal efforts. 
I. THE PLACE OF CAPITAL COSTS IN CONTEMPORARY HOUSING 
PRICE: A POLICY PROBLEM 
The cost of housing is a function of the price of land, materi-
als, capital, labor, and industry organization.10 The two elements 
of housing cost that have shown the greatest increase as a per-
centage of overall housing costs since 1949 are the cost of capital 
and the cost of land.11 
Labor costs have not increased as a percentage of the cost of 
housing production since 1970.12 Surprisingly, the percentage 
has even decreased somewhat because of emerging trends toward 
preassembly of modular units and the use of more unskilled 
workers for assembly at the site.18 The cost of materials as a 
percentage of overall housing cost has also remained fairly sta-
ble, primarily as a result of the use of new technologies, new 
substances in place of wood, and standardized, preassembled 
9. Middle income households are finding it increasingly difficult to purchase housing 
because of rising construction and capital costs. See generally infra notes 20 and 51-67 
and accompanying text. Conditions for renters have also worsened. See generally infra 
notes 147-60 and accompanying text. On the problems of homelessness, see infra notes 
165-74 and accompanying text. 
10. Schussheim, Housing: An Overview, in HousING-A READER, supra note 1, at 12, 
15. A larger, more concentrated industry can achieve economies of scale and other effi-
ciencies. See NAHB, supra note 1, at 111. 
11. See generally Saltojanes, lnfi.ation in Housing Costs, in HouSING-A READER, 
supra note 1, at 32, 34-37. 
12. Id. at 34. 
13. See id.; NAHB, supra note 1, at 117-18. 
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parts. 14 Small builders, materials suppliers, and construction 
workers have not embraced these innovations, however.1~ Local 
governments closely regulate such materials as well, further lim-
iting their use.16 Finally, established homeowners often oppose 
inexpensive housing per se, as they feel it depresses property 
values, or competes with their own homes on the market when 
they wish to sell. 17 
Unlike the cost of labor and materials, the cost of land has 
risen as a percentage of total housing cost since 1949. This in-
crease is primarily attributable to higher site preparation costs 
due to stringent environmental and land use controls.18 So costly 
and arduous is the process of complying with these controls that 
larger builders have begun to subcontract out site preparation to 
small entrepreneurs who are struggling to stay in business.19 
14. NAHB, supra note 1, at 16; Saltojanes, supra note 11, at 35; see NAHB, supra 
note 1, at 116-19. 
15. Schussheim, supra note 10, at 15. To the contrary, extensive use of the new tech-
nologies is positively associated with large-scale builders, a concentrated industry, and a 
relatively homogeneous range of consumer preferences for housing. 
The National Association of Home Builders divides builders into three groups: large 
developers (100 dwelling units per year or more), medium builders (26-100 units per 
year), and small builders (less than 26 units per year). Large developers build on a large 
scale, using assembly line technology and less skilled workers. In 1982, they built 9.7% of 
the housing in the United States (up from 7.4% in 1978). Medium builders, who build on 
their own land and sell to the public, built 17.6% of the housing in 1982, down from 
19.7% in 1978. NAHB, supra note 1, at 111. Small builders engage primarily in remodel-
ing, rehabilitation, and subcontracting to the larger builders, especially for site prepara-
tion. See id. 
The large multifamily developers have significantly increased their activity in the 
United States, but so have the small general contractor/subcontractors. The middle-
range general contractors are the ones being squeezed out; they are not large enough to 
compete for capttal or utilize economies of scale to match the large builders, yet are not 
flexible or versatile enough to compete for remodeling or subcontracting work with small 
builders. Id. at 111-12. On the whole, the industry is much less concentrated than other 
large American industries, and certainly less than its Japanese counterpart, for example. 
Sheridan, Made in Japan, BUILDER. Jan. 1986, at 228-33. The likely result of the varying 
factors affecting the organization of production and the cost of materials is a mixture of 
craft work and assembly line techniques, and a stabilizing of the cost of construction. 
Schussheim, supra note 10, at 15. 
16. Schussheim, supra note 10, at 15. 
17. Id. at 15-16. 
18. Exclusionary zoning drives up the price of land, making it difficult to produce an 
affordable housing package, closing suburban housing and land markets to low and mod-
erate income families. See Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclu-
sionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509, 519 (1971). 
In contrast, positive action by state and local legislatures can harness the development 
process itself to actually reduce the cost of housing. See McDougall, From Litigation to 
Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 630-31, 635-39, 
642-50 (1987) (set-aside techniques); see also discussions of "linkage" techniques infra 
notes 200-11 and accompanying text. 
19. NAHB, supra note 1, at 111. 
732 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:3 
The cost of capital, however, is the factor that has increased 
the most since 1949 as a percentage of overall housing cost.20 
Most of the increase can be attributed to tax deductions for 
mortgage interest and fluctuating interest rates due to changes 
in housing credit markets. Capital costs have become increas-
ingly important as the government has subsidized private home 
ownership through tax deductions for mortgage interest pay-
ments. These deductions have encouraged consumers to pay far 
more for owner-occupied housing, drastically inflating the price 
of housing for owners and renters alike, and further widening 
the gap between income and housing price. 21 
II. FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN22 
The problem of affordable housing-the gap between income 
and housing price-can be addressed by reducing housing cost 
(the supply side) or increasing consumer buying power (the de-
mand side). Both techniques have been used, with varying de-
grees of success, during the fifty-year period that marks the 
height of national consciousness regarding this issue. 
At the national level, middle income homeowners have been 
the focal point of public policy.23 This Part will discuss tech-
niques for facilitating middle income home ownership that range 
from supply-side mortgage insurance and secondary market ac-
tivity to demand-side mortgage interest payment deductions. 
Supply- and demand-side techniques for facilitating low and 
moderate income rental housing will also be discussed. 2• 
20. See Saltojanes, supra note 11, at 35. 
21. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text. 
22. For an overview of federal housing policy, see Fernslere, Tuttle, Kessler, Kogan, 
Simons & Walsh, Historical Perspectives, Current Trends and Future Roles in Housing 
and Community Development, 16 URB. LAW. 683, 687-90 (1984); Nolon, Reexamining 
Federal Housing Programs in a Time of Austerity: The Trend Toward Block Grants 
and Housing Allowances, 14 URB. LAW. 249, 253-57 (1982). See also Bender, Federal 
Budget Cuts in Housing: Is There No Place Like a Decent Home?, 10 J. LEGIS. 457, 457-
67 (1983). 
23. On rental versus home ownership in federal policy, see Hoeflich & Malloy, The 
Shattered Dream of American Housing Policy-The Nee_d for Reform, 26 B.C.L. REV. 
655, 657-59 (1985). 
24. Other supply-side subsidy methods include: federal purchase of privately 
originated mortgages; below market interest rate mortgages achieved through direct fed-
eral loans or payment of all or part of the debt service on a private loan; financing based 
on tax exempt bonds; and tax savings to housing investors through rapid depreciation or 
"low income housing tax credits." Milgram, supra note 3, at 104-06. 
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A. Supply-Side Techniques: The Roosevelt Legacy 
1. Middle class housing on the supply side- Because hous-
ing is usually too expensive an item to be purchased outright, 
the structure and functioning of capital markets for mortgage 
financing has proven central to the program of providing home 
ownership opportunities to the middle class. As a result of vari-
ous governmental subsidies, home mortgage financing today rep-
resents about twenty percent of the Nation's investment capital, 
the largest single use of investment capital in the economy.211 Be-
cause housing starts are very sensitive to the interest rate, the 
large share of investment capital devoted to financing middle 
class home ownership causes a grave instability in general capi-
tal markets. The financial crises of the early 1930's demonstrate 
that the economic instability associated with housing finance can 
jeopardize the entire economy. 26 
The New Deal sought to counter this dangerous volatility by 
segregating housing finance from general capital markets. The 
federal government also committed substantial funds for subsi-
dizing the housing capital market and set up an extensive regu-
latory system for housing finance. Policy objectives other than 
the provision of housing-economic stabilization and rationali-
zation of capital movement on a regional and national ba-
sis-played a major role in federal housing policy of the time. 27 
These various objectives were pursued through the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and affiliated agencies, a sys-
tem of federal support for and regulation of savings and loan 
banks that engaged primarily in home mortgage lending. The 
FHLBB tinkers with the secondary mortgage market, which 
draws in investment capital to "bail out" primary lenders. 
a. The FHLBB and its affiliates- From 1932 to 1947, the 
government established six major organizations to aid housing: 
25. Miles, supra note 4, at 45. 
26. On October 24, 1929-"Black Tuesday"-prices on the New York Stock Ex-
change collapsed, leading to an economic downturn that caused unemployment to in-
crease from 3.2% to 23.6% by 1932. D. Juno, supra note 1, at 128. The average income of 
employed persons decreased 42.5% from 1929 to 1933. Id. 
Financial panics drastically curtailed lenders' ability to hold deposits, prompting dras-
tic disintermediation. Outstanding mortgages (often with terms as short as five years) 
were called in to cover withdrawals, precipitating foreclosures. Because private mortgage 
insurers at the time could not cover foreclosure losses of that magnitude, they also went 
under. Miles, supra note 4, at 47-48. Twenty-five percent of all homes were foreclosed in 
1932, and more than 1000 homes were lost daily in early 1933. D. Juno, supra note 1, at 
129. 
27. Milgram, supra note 3, at 98. 
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The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA), the home financing division of the Vet-
eran's Administration, and the Housing Home Finance Agency 
(HHFA). The FHLBB, established in 1932 by President Hoover, 
but restructured by Roosevelt during the first year of his admin-
istration, was the cornerstone of New Deal strategy.28 In 1933, it 
began chartering federal savings and loan institutions (S & L's) 
to serve the home mortgage financing market. 29 Deposits in 
S & L's were insured by the FSLIC under the same Act that es-
tablished the FHA. so 
The FHA was created in 1934 to operate independently of, 
but in association with, the FHLBB system. 31 The FHA pro-
vided home mortgage insurance. FHA insurance spread the risk 
of mortgage default across the taxpaying public and correspond-
ingly reduced the risk taken by the lender.32 The FHA was 
chartered to facilitate home ownership, encourage uniformity 
among lending institutions, and upgrade housing stock. 
28. The FHLBB was established by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 
72-304, 47 Stat. 725 {1932) {codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1430, 1430b-1440, 
1442-1449 {1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), and along with its 12 regional banks constituted a 
reserve system for the Nation's S & L's. The system required restructuring and recapital-
ization by the time of the New Deal, primarily because it was not undertaken in the 
context of overall economic reform. NAHB, supra note 1, at 31; Miles, supra note 4, at 
48; see supra note 4. 
29. ·NAHB, supra note 1, at 31. Federally chartered S & L's were set up by the Home 
Owner's Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 {codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 
1461-1462, 1464-1466a, 1468 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), and depositors' accounts therein 
were insured by the FSLIC under the National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, tit. IV, 
§ 401-407, 48 Stat. 1246, 1255-61 (1934) {codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730 {1982 & 
Supp. IV 1986)). As of 1982, there were 3300 such institutions. Miles, supra note 4, at 56; 
see supra note 4. 
30. See supra note 29. 
31. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1246, 1246 {1934) 
{codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703 {1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The Federal Horne Owners 
Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created as a subsidiary of FHLBB with an initial capital-
ization of $400 million. The HOLC enabled debtors to transform their obligations from 
the popular short-term balloon note devices (rarely covering more than 50% of the 
purchase price of the home), to the long-term, low interest, low down payment instru-
ment that was the cornerstone of New Deal home ownership policy. The HOLC received 
$2.0 billion in lending authority to purchase delinquent mortgages, and thousands of 
home owners were saved from foreclosure of their houses. During the HOLC's most ac-
tive period, it held 15% of all mortgage debts. When the HOLC was dissolved in 1951, it 
showed a $14 million profit. NAHB, supra note 1, at 31. 
32. Conventional lenders require private mortgage insurance {PMI) on any home 
mortgage transaction in which the loan to value ratio is greater than 90 % . One hundred 
and twenty-one billion dollars of such insurance was in force in 1982 alone. Miles, supra 
note 4, at 61. 
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Ten years later, the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 194433 
established another government housing organization, the Veter-
ans' Administration (VA). The VA offered federally guaranteed 
home mortgages, with no down payments, to ten million 
veterans. 
Finally, in 1947, the government consolidated its various hous-
ing programs under HHF A, the forerunner of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).34 New Deal financing 
structures-FHLBB, FHA, VA, ~HF A-facilitated, channeled, 
and directed the tremendous housing demand that existed at the 
close of World War II and transformed the United States from a 
nation of renters to a nation of home owners, contrary to hous-
ing tenure patterns throughout the world. Housing starts surged 
from 326,000 in 1945 to one million in 1946.35 
Savings and loan banks, federally chartered by the FHLBB, 
provided the principal source of mortgage lending for middle 
class homeowners of the post-war era. Federal law insulated the 
S & L's from competition with commercial banks and gave the 
S & L's access to advances of funds from regional Federal Home 
Loan Banks. At the same time, other regulations restricted 
S & L's investment opportunities. As a result, the S & L's es-
chewed risk and devoted a substantial portion of their funds to 
home mortgage lending. 
The early programs' successes were not without their costs. 
The FHA's early years were marred by the agency's support for 
racially restrictive covenants,36 which suburban developers 
adopted to protect property values, and by its refusal to insure 
mortgages originating from black areas, which encouraged inner 
city redlining. 87 The VA mortgage program, oblivious to the out-
33. Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 693 (1982)). 
34. Pursuant to Truman's Reorganization Plan No. 3, July 27, 1947, the FHA became 
a department of the HHFA. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1947, 3 C.F.R. 1071 (1943-1948), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1037 (1982), and in 61 Stat. 954. The HHFA itself was raised 
to cabinet level as the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1965 by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, § 3, 79 Stat. 
667 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (1982)). 
35. A key factor in this spurt of housing development was the National Housing Act 
of 1949. NAHB, supra note 1, at 32. 
36. Racially restrictive covenants preceded exclusionary zoning, which developed af-
ter judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants was declared an unconstitutional state 
action under the fourteenth amendment by the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
37. Blacks were denied FHA insurance for mortgage loans in inner city neighbor-
hoods, leading not only to minority concentration but to neighborhood deterioration. 
The FHA claimed that the influence of blacks made the neighborhoods too risky for 
investment. Private lenders, loath to lend in these areas in any event, were even less 
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standing contribution black veterans had made to the war effort, 
followed the same discriminatory practices as the FHA. FHA 
and VA discriminatory practices skewed the great spurt of hous-
ing production and suburbanization of the late 1940's and the 
1950's,38 resulting in a rigid pattern of metropolitan segregation 
that persists today.39 
b. The secondary mortgage market- The secondary mort-
gage market provides a means by which loans originated by 
S & L's and mortgage banks can be sold to investors, freeing the 
primary lenders to originate more mortgages. Mortgages are 
traded individually on the secondary market or can be pooled.40 
In the latter case, securities based on the pool41 are traded on 
the market rather than the mortgages themselves.42 In either 
case, loans originating in areas where the demand for credit ex-
ceeds the supply can be traded on the secondary market to areas 
where the supply of credit (in the form of deposits) exceeds 
demand.43 
After initial experimentation with wholly private secondary 
mortgage associations, Congress chartered the FNMA in 1938, 
the first public institution of this type, to rationalize capital mo-
tion between regional housing markets.44 The FNMA, originally 
likely to do so without FHA insurance. See R. Shiffman, Citizen Involvement in Housing 
and Community Development 6 (Nov. 16, 1985) (unpublished paper). 
38. This spurt resulted from returning veterans' demand for family space; productive 
capacity developed for war, newly devoted to peacetime purposes, which led to new jobs 
and increased housing needs; banks' need for new investment opportunities; and defense 
department directions to protect essential industry from nuclear attack by dispersal be-
yond the urban perimeter. Id. at 8-9. The shift of industry was also facilitated by new 
technology mandating spread out factories for assembly line techniques. Population in-
creases followed the decentralization of industrial jobs to the suburbs. D. HARVEY, Soc1AL 
JUSTICE AND THE CITY 61 (1973). 
Ironically, by the 1970's, fuel shortages and new technology permitting personnel and 
productive capacity to be protected from nuclear attack combined to reverse the centrip-
etal force attached to these factors. R. Shiffman, supra note 37, at 8. Recentralization 
will make metropolitan areas less dependent on imported oil, for example. The civil 
rights movement also removed some of the racial barriers and tension that made urban 
living unpalatable a generation before. Id. at 8. 
39. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 
1283 (7th Cir. 1977). 
40. The FHA insures mortgage pools as well as individual mortgages. Under such 
arrangements, the payment rate and principal amount, in addition to the mortgage, are 
insured. Miles, supra note 4, at 61. 
41. Investors are provided with a certificate guaranteeing participation in a percent-
age of the value of the pool and the income generated by it. Miles, supra note 4, at 51-52. 
42. Id. at 46. 
43. Id. at 50. 
44. The FNMA guaranteed the purchase of any FHA-insured loan, thus contributing 
to uniformity of clauses in mortgage instruments. Id. at 48. The FNMA was chartered 
pursuant to the Act of July 1, 1938, Pub. L. No. 80-864, 62 Stat. 1206 (codified as 
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chartered to handle FHA-insured mortgages, has gone through a 
number-of transformations since then. In 1948, the FNMA was 
given responsibility for processing VA-guaranteed loans. In 1954, 
the FNMA was partly privatized, in response to the growing 
strain on the federal budget occasioned by its operations.'11 
In 1968, Congress assigned the FNMA's "special assistance" 
functions of managing and liquidating certain subsidized mort-
gages that had been created in the 1960's to a newly-formed sec-
ondary market association, the Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA).'6 The FNMA was further privatized as a 
result, becoming a federally-sponsored, semiprivate, stockholder-
owned corporation." In its new privatized form, the FNMA con-
tinued to trade FHA and VA loans in the secondary market and 
also to manage or liquidate the "seasoned" mortgage loans that 
it had in its portfolio as of 1968. In 1970, Congress allowed the 
FNMA to add conventional mortgages to its portfolio,'8 though 
it was restricted to mortgage amounts thought to correspond 
with the upward limits of moderate income housing.'9 Congress 
established the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(FHLMC) at the same time it loosened the FNMA's portfolio 
limits. The FHLMC facilitated S & L's resort to the secondary 
market by accepting conventional mortgages regardless of prin-
cipal amount. 110 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1716-1721 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (replacing the former 
National Mortgage Associations created by the National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-
479, tit. III, §§ 301-308, 48 Stat. 1246, 1252 (1934) (originally codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
1716)). 
45. Miles, supra note 4, at 49. The FNMA was federally chartered as a mixed public-
private company, using separate accounts to segregate its "special assistance" functions 
for subsidized housing from its more profitable secondary mortgage market operations. 
Id. The reorganization was accomplished pursuant to the Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. 
No. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986)). Miles, supra note 4, at 49. 
46. See Miles, supra note 4, at 50-51. The FNMA was partitioned into the FNMA 
and the GNMA to facilitate a rationalization of the secondary mortgage market, particu-
larly with respect to the activities of S & L's and mortgage bankers. The Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. III, §§ 301-318, 82 Stat. 476, 
505-513 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), accomplished the split. In 1974, the 
GNMA itself was altered; it became authorized to purchase $7.5 billion worth of mort-
gages to pump capital into the housing market via a "tandem plan" that survived until 
1980. Milgrarn, supra note 3, at 105-06. For a general discussion of GNMA securities, see 
Fernslee, supra note 22, at 698-99. 
47. NAHB, supra note 1, at 34-35. 
48. Emergency Horne Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, tit. II, § 201, 84 Stat. 
450, 450 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). 
49. "Moderate" income housing meant housing that did not exceed a $100,000 
purchase price. Id. 
50. The FHLMC is a "pooling" mechanism, buying conventional mortgages and issu-
ing securities based on its loan portfolio. 
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c. Disintermediation and S & L failure: Prelude to the Rea-
gan years- A crisis buffeted the New Deal home financing sys-
tem beginning in the late 1960's-disintermediation. The term 
has been called a "splendid neologism" by Professor 
Mandelker/1 and signifies the loss by S & L's of their position as 
financial intermediaries between their depositors and persons 
wishing to finance the purchase of a home (hence "dis-
intermedia:tion"). By the 1960's, the centrality of the S & L's as 
the cornerstone of federal housing policy for the middle class be-
gan to be challenged by mortgage bankers.'s2 Increasing fluctua-
tions in interest rates113 had undermined the S & L's ability to 
intermediate-that is, to draw in funds from depositors11• at a 
low interest rateH and relend to home purchasers at higher 
rates. Because so much of their business was mortgage lending, 
many S & L's faltered or went under completely. 
During the last years of the Carter administration and the 
early years of the Reagan administration, disintermediation and 
the resultant problems of S & L's were dealt with by a one hun-
dred and eighty-degree turn from New Deal pol-
51. R. MONTGOMERY & 0. MANDELKER. HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPEC-
TIVES 268 (2d ed. 1979). 
52. Mortgage bankers originated FHA- and VA-approved mortgages and sold them to 
the FNMA. They thus used the secondary market as a partial buffer against fluctuating 
interest rates. S & L's, in contrast, tended to hold their mortgages and service them 
rather than resell them on the secondary market. S & L's resorted to the secondary mar-
ket only to replenish reserves. Miles, supra note 4, at 50-51. They also generally dealt in 
conventional rather than FHA or VA loans, which limited their access to the secondary 
market. Id. at 50. 
53. Interest rates have fluctuated partly by design, as the Federal Reserve Board 
tightens and loosens monetary policy by increasing and decreasing the discount rate (the 
interest rate the Board charges on loans to financial institutions). Interest rates have 
been decreased to stimulate the domestic economy and increased to stimulate foreign 
investment. Paradoxically,- the former strategy is needed to get the economy out of a 
slump, but the latter is necessary to finance our trade and budget deficits as long as the 
economy is in a slump. Berry, Greenspan-A Man Aware of Feasibility, Wash. Post, 
June 14, 1987, at D1, col. 4, D3, col. 1. Sharp declines in the dollar exchange rate on the 
international market in April 1987 led to surges in long-term interest rates and caused 
the Fed to tighten monetary policy. See id. at D3, col. 2. A dollar declining in value on 
the international market, combined with high interest rates, creates inflation (inflation 
might reduce the trade deficit, however). Id. at D3, col. 4 (quoting Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman, Federal Reserve Board). 
54. The depositors abandoned the S & L's because of higher rates available from in-
struments such as money market mutual funds. See Meyerson, Deregulation and the 
Restructuring of the Housing Finance System, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN Hous1NG 68, 
70-71 (R. Bratt, C. Hartman & A. Meyerson eds. 1986). 
55. Miles, supra note 4, at 49. On September 25, 1966, deposit rate ceilings-one-half 
percent higher than federal reserve rates for commercial banks-were introduced by the 
FHLBB. Act of Sept. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.) (Regulation Q). 
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icy-deregulation. One phase of deregulation was to make 
S & L's more competitive with commercial banks and mutual 
funds as candidates for public savings. A variety of short-term 
investment instruments were authorized to make S & L's more 
attractive loci of savers' deposits despite rising interest rates.118 
These instruments were generally more attractive to investors, 
as they provided higher interest rates and shorter terms than 
those that S & L's had previously offered.117 
Though these instruments brought in deposits, their high 
rates and short terms required interest payments that were in-
compatible with the S & L's long-term, low interest mortgages 
that still comprised the bulk of their portfolios. At the same 
time, new mortgages were difficult to sell because of prohibi-
tively high interest rates. In an effort to make mortgages with 
higher interest rates more palatable to the housing consumer, a 
variety of exotic mortgage instruments were permitted, all of 
which served to pass the higher risks prevalent on the market to 
the borrower. 118 
At the same time, the general process of deregulation allowed 
S & L's to make riskier investments to generate the high interest 
rates demanded by the new savings instruments and to behave 
more like commercial banks. 119 Few S & L's were prepared for 
56. The money market certificate, a 26-week, $10,000 certificate with interest rates 
pegged to six-month U.S. treasury bills, was introduced in 1978 to compete with money 
market mutual funds. Miles, supra note 4, at 52. The All Savers Certificate, featuring tax 
exemption for interest payments up to $2000, was introduced in 1980 to facilitate S & L's 
competition for savers' deposits. Unfortunately, the certificate's one-year term meant 
that deposits would not be available long enough to cover home mortgage lending. I.R.C. 
§ 128 (1986); Miles, supra note 4, at 52. Accounts permitting a negotiable order of with-
drawal (i.e., interest bearing checking accounts), were authorized by the FHLBB on De-
cember 1, 1980. Id. at 53. 
57. The federal law setting maximum permissible interest rates was also repealed. 
Meyerson, supra note 54, at 74. 
58. Variable rate mortgages were authorized on July 1, 1979. Miles, supra note 4, at 
53 n.24. Renegotiable rate mortgages were authorized on April 30, 1980. Id. By 1974, the 
FHA was authorized to offer graduated payment mortgages-the size of monthly pay-
ments, low at the start, and increasing to a higher level that remains steady over the life 
of the mortgage. NAHB. supra note 1, at 35. Adjustable rate mortgages were authorized 
in April 1981. Miles, supra note 4, at 53 n.24. Balloon note mortgages were authorized in 
October 1981. Id. Balloon note mortgages are reminiscent of the type that brought the 
industry down in 1929. When banks refused to refinance the balloons, mortgagees re-
sponded with default, and the banks responded with foreclosure. 
59. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Decontrol Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 15 
U.S.C.); see also Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of '11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 20 
U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). 
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the competition or the pressure, however, and they began to 
dash themselves between the rocks of disintermediation and di-
sastrous investments. By 1981, both the home ownership and 
mortgage lending industries were in deep trouble-seventy-five 
percent of all S & L's were unprofitable. 60 Because deregulation 
deconstructed many of the barriers that insulated housing from 
commercial lending, the failure of the S & L's threatened to take 
the whole financial market under, in a replay of the scenario of 
1929.61 
The FSLIC, established to head off threats to the economic 
system at large posed by S & L instability, proved unable to 
keep up with the precipitous increase in S & L failures after 
1980. The FHLBB drew heavily on FSLIC funds to close down 
many sick S & L's or merge them with healthier thrifts. As a re-
sult, the FSLIC's resources were taxed severely. Congress re-
acted to the crisis and passed a bill that recapitalized the 
FSLIC.62 
The gap in home mortgage finance left by the exit of the 
S & L's might be addressed, though probably not filled, by a 
combination of mortgage bankers originating mortgages for pen-
sion funds, insurance companies, and secondary market associa-
tions. Regulations restricting pension fund activity in residential 
mortgage lending are being lifted to facilitate the funds' entry 
into the field. 63 Their participation would most likely be at the 
secondary market stage, via mortgage-backed securities.64 Be-
cause the funds have capital available and can commit for long 
periods of time, they would seem to be good candidates to take 
over some part of the S & L's role. It is doubtful that the pen-
sion funds will be able to fill entirely the gap left by the exit of 
· the S & L's, however.611 
60. See, e.g., Biscayne Fed. Sav. & Loan v. FHLBB, 572 F. Supp. 997, 1009 (S.D. Fla. 
1983). 
61. Miles, supra note 4, at 54; see also Meyerson, supra note 54, at 70-72. 
62. See infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text. 
63. Miles, supra note 4, at 58. 
64. Such securities are being issued by the FNMA, the GNMA, and the FHLMC. 
There is talk of establishing private secondary mortgage institutions, but securities of 
secondary market institutions have typically not been attractive on the market without 
some form of government guarantee. Miles, supra note 4, at 52. 
65. Crutsinger, Housing Starts Fall Again in May, Wash. Post, June 17, 1987, at F3, 
col. 1, F3, col. 1; see also supra note 53. 
In the short term, the situation has been partially alleviated by the Federal Reserve 
Board's (Fed) loosening of the money supply. This helps by bringing down interest rates, 
but brings about more inflation. Such measures by the Fed cannot continue if the value 
of the dollar keeps falling relative to the currency of other developed nations, however. 
See supra note 53. 
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The Reagan administration has sought not to regulate the role 
of mortgage credit in the economy but rather to reduce the cen-
trality of the role of housing mortgages in the financial system as 
a whole. The present administration appears to view reliance on 
housing for economic growth and stability as unjustified. 66 The 
Republican program has rather been to attempt to merge hous-
ing finance with general capital markets, and to eliminate sub-
sidy and regulation in all financial sectors. Deregulation, how-
ever, has not only accelerated the flow of capital out of the 
housing mortgage market but significantly weakened the entire 
financial system as well.67 
2. Supply-side techniques for low and moderate income 
housing- Providing new housing at upper income levels using 
existing techniques has proven tremendously expensive and 
drives up the cost of housing for sale or rent throughout the 
market.68 Moreover, arguments that new construction at upper 
income levels trickles down to the poor have been strongly re-
butted since the 195O's, partly because the number of lower in-
come families is greater than the number of upper income fami-
lies69 and also because the chain of housing unit exchange 
between affluent homeowners and housing consumers in lower 
income and minority groups is lengthy and fragmented.70 
The consequence of these structural problems is that either 
affordable housing for low and moderate income71 persons must 
66. Schussheim, The Reagan Approach to Housing, in Congressional Research Ser-
vice Paper 87-142s, Feb. 23, 1987, at CRS-4. 
67. Meyerson, supra note 54, at 92-93. See also infra notes 144-45, 175-85 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the severe overextension of the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation resulting from widespread S & L failures. 
68. The annual cost of mortgage interest deductions alone is nearly $30 billion per 
year. The cost was $29.3 billion in fiscal year 1981, for tax savings to 22 million income 
households. By fiscal year 1983, the total cost had increased to $36.1 billion. Nine-tenths 
of these savings go to households with incomes over $20,000 per year. Milgram, supra 
note 3, at 107-08. 
69. R. MONTGOMERY & D. MANDELKER, supra note 51, at 254. 
70. Breaks in the chain occur because of submarkets that are racially and/or econom-
ically segregated. Most new housing since World War II has been constructed in the 
suburbs, virtually inaccessible to the poor. Id. at 47. 
71. For the Census Bureau, typical "very low income persons" belong to four-person 
households with incomes that are 50% or less of the median income for the Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) in which they live. "Low income persons" are in 
four-person households with incomes that are between 50% and 80% of the median in-
come for their SMSA, and "moderate income persons" are in four-person households 
that have incomes that are between 80% and 100% of median income for their SMSA. 
"Middle income persons" are in four-person households with incomes higher than 100% 
of SMSA median income, with the average income of a four-person family in this cate-
gory being about 120% of SMSA median income. In 1983, 22.9 million people-27% of 
all households-had very low income, 15.5 million (18%) had low income, and 8.8 million 
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be directly introduced into the housing supply through an ex-
panded program of public or publicly assisted housing construc-
tion, or the incomes of such persons must be supplemented. 
Supply-side policies have included direct government construc-
tion (public housing), direct governmental loans (section 202 of 
the Housing Act of 1959),72 assistance in debt service (GNMA 
tandem mortgages, sections 235 and 236), and below market in-
terest rates secured by federal insurance or guarantees (section 
221(d)(5)).73 
Housing problems at lower income levels involve a wide range 
of social problems such as racial and economic integration, job 
creation, and urban blight. Some policy objectives point toward 
new construction, others toward demand subsidies, and still 
others toward subsidies at different levels-reaching more or 
fewer citizens, of greater or lesser income. 74 Policies may also 
conflict-racial desegregation may conflict with the development 
of affordable housing, for example.7 1! Demand subsidies them-
selves may have the side effect of inflating rents in the absence 
of stringent rent controls. Such conflicts make the passage of 
comprehensive housing legislation difficult, as a policy that feeds 
the ox of one group gores the ox of another. Only in times of 
great social attention to housing issues and in times of relative 
prosperity is it possible for comprehensive housing legislation, 
such as the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, to be 
passed.76 
(10%) had moderate income. Forty-five percent of the population is middle income or 
higher according to these statistics, a somewhat reassuring figure until we note that the 
national median income is only $27,500. Thus 55% of the population makes less than 
$27,500 per year. See generally NATIONAL Ass'N OF HOME BUILDERS, Low- & MoDERATE-
INCOME HOUSING 1-2 (1986) [hereinafter NAHB II]. 
72. Pub. L. No. 86-372, § 202, 73 Stat. 654, 667 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (1982 & 
Supp. IV 1986)). 
73. Milgram, Housing the Urban Poor: Urban Housing Assistance Programs, in 
Hous1NG-A READER, supra note 1, at 114, 116 [hereinafter Milgram, Housing]; Milgram, 
supra note 3, at 105-06. 
74. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 115-16. For example, new construction is 
required for large families or the handicapped, or for developing integrated housing in 
segregated areas. Id. 
75. Id. (e.g., the only economically feasible development sites in a particular munici-
pality for low income housing might lie in a black neighborhood). 
76. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.), 
introduced a program of mortgage amortization subsidies that greatly expanded the op-
portunities of low and moderate income people to rent and own housing. The 1968 Act 
amended the Housing Act of 1949 to create § 235 homeownership (12 U.S.C. § 1715z 
(1982)) and § 236 rental programs (12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1982)). For further discussion, 
see infra notes 93 and 102-07 and accompanying text. 
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a. Public housing- Where national will and national re-
sources are limited, housing policy is less ambitious. The na-
tional government first experimented with direct production of 
housing during World War I, when the units were constructed 
for the use of workers in wartime industry. The experiment was 
not long lasting, however, as all the units were sold on the pri-
vate market as soon as the war was over.77 The next large-scale 
effort was introduced during the Depression, by the United 
States Housing Act of 1937.78 The United States Housing Au-
thority (USHA), established by the 1937 Act to administer the 
development of public housing, built on the earlier experiences 
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which made four 
percent loans to limited dividend corporations, the National Re-
covery Administration, which had its own subsistence housing 
program, the Public Works Administration, and the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, which experimented with new 
towns and greenbelt communities.79 
The primary purpose for which the 1937 Act was passed was 
not housing but job creation.80 Housing construction seemed a 
logical way to employ people, as the Nation's housing stock was 
marred by major disrepair and lack of essential facilities. Shelter 
advocates, blight-fighters, and those concerned with stimulating 
employment merged into an uneasy coalition to get the 1937 Act 
passed over the objection of conservative business interests.81 In 
deference to political and constitutional objections, local housing 
aqthorities, not the federal government, took on the task of de-
veloping, constructing, and managing public housing. 82 
Under the public housing system, local housing authorities 
(LHA's) borrowed construction funds from the federal govern-
ment83 and committed themselves to repay the debt from the 
proceeds of tax-exempt bonds issued with the full faith and 
credit of the federal government.8' The housing was then devel-
oped, constructed, and managed by the LHA's, which used pro-
77. See generally supra note 1. 
78. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified at 
42 u.s.c. § 1437 (1982)). 
79. R. Shiffman, supra note 37, at 5-6; see supra note 1. 
80. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 121. 
81. Legislation was opposed by the Chamber of Commerce, realtors, home builders, 
and savings and loan institutions, which called instead for housing certificates. See D. 
Juno, supra note 1, at 263. 
82. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Lands, 78 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1935). 
83. Initially, the United States Housing Authority lent the construction funds; now 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development·does so. Milgram, Housing, supra 
note 73, at 121. 
84. Id. at 121-22. Public housing is now financed by "up-front" grants. 
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ject rents to cover operating expenses. Tlie bond debt was ser- -
viced by the federal government with funds issued pursuant to 
an annual contributions contract, which now comprises the prin-
cipal vehicle by which the USHA (now part of HUD) regulates 
LHA's operation of public housing.811 
Working people buffeted by the Depression were the first to 
occupy public housing; in fact it was for this group that public 
housing was conceived. After World War II, however, opportuni- _ 
ties for home ownership and jobs in the suburbs opened up to 
many such people. Income ceilings for continued occupancy in 
public housing also propelled upwardly mobile persons out of 
public housing and into the private sector. Federal regulations 
required that project tenants' incomes be twenty percent below 
that needed to purchase decent housing on the private market, 
to ensure private developers a comfortable margin from compe-
tition by public housing.86 Not only did projects become reserva-·· 
tions for the exclusively low income groups, but so-called "mod-
erate" income groups, caught in the twenty percent gap between 
the public and the private sector, could not find affordable hous-
ing at all. More and more, public housing became the living 
quarters of minorities and the poor who were left behind after 
waves of suburbanization that took place between 1944 and 
1960.87 
Early public housing projects were built on a very large scale 
to provide fuel, utilities, and other economies. When public 
housing became "housing of last resort" for low income people· 
and those displaced by slum clearance and urban renewal,88 the 
large scale of the projects also meant a concentration of people 
with social problems, some rather extreme. 89 With tenant 
85. In 1984, outstanding federal obligations in this regard amounted to $20 billion. 
Id. at 122. Local authorities also make payments by waiving property taxes. Id. 
86. Id. at 123. To this day, however, the private homebuilding industry is reluctant to 
support subsidized or public housing and considers the FHLBB system and federal tax· 
incentives to be the prime focus of its housing policy. See Will Emerging Consensus 
Policy Be Enough to Restore Housing as a National Priority?, HOUSING AFF. LE'ITER, 
Mar. 27, 1987, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Emerging Consensus Policy]. 
87. The result of the federal income ceilings was to make public housing strictly 
lower class housing, a departure from the European model and a measure that doomed 
American public housing to become sites of concentrated social problems. D. JUDD, supra 
note 1, at 298 & n.21. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 123. 
88. For a general discussion on the selection of tenants for public housing, see Com-
ment, Public Housing: Choosing Among Families in Need of Housing, 77 Nw. U.L. REV .. 
700 (1982). 
89. D. JuDD, supra note 1, at 276 (income limits and urban renewal relocation policies 
combined to make public housing a racially segregated institution for low income black 
and hispanic families); see also Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 123-24 (at worst, 
public housing was populated by criminals _and drug addicts; at best, by "undisciplined, 
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problems increasing, maintenance becoming more expensive, 
and tenant income held at low levels, public housing throughout 
the country incurred operating deficits; essential services suf-
fered, and deterioration and expenses increased. 00 Granting op-
erating subsidies to projects in difficulty became a regular prac-
tice, and these subsidies climbed to one billion dollars per year 
by fiscal year 1982. 91 Public housing development that now takes 
place is either rehabilitation of existing units or small scale new 
construction. 92 
b. Assisted housing- Direct housing production is an ex-
pensive and government-intrusive supply-side technique.93 The 
fatherless families" with little income and social problems including joblessness, poor 
educ9:tion, and poor health). 
90. Public housing has languished since the Nixon administration, when public hous-
ing starts declined from 104,000 in 1970 to only 19,000 in 1974. D. JUDD, supra note 1, at 
277. 
91. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 124. Note that over 700 public housing units 
in the country receive no subsidy whatsoever. Telephone interview with Roberta You-
mans, Attorney for National Housing Law Project, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 13, 1987) 
[hereinafter Youmans Interview]. 
92. Youmans Interview, supra note 91. 
93. Ironically, subsequent efforts by the federal government to back out of direct 
housing production led to supply-side programs that were less government-intrusive but 
much more costly. 
These efforts were presented programmatically as amendments to the National Hous-
ing Act of 1949. 
(a) § 221 Housing for Moderate Income and Displaced Families 
Section 221(d)(3) 
The requirements to be eligible for insurance under this act included that the mort-
gage be executed by a mortgagor which was a public body or agency, cooperative, limited 
dividend cooperative, private nonprofit corporation, or other mortgagor approved by the 
Secretary. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
Section 221(d)(5) 
The mortgage also was required to bear interest at a rate to be agreed on by the mort-
gagor and mortgagee and to provide for payment, repairs, payment of taxes, foreclosure 
proceedings, etc. The interest rate was to be not lower than three percent per year or the 
annual rate determined by the Secretary. Id. § 17151(d)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
(b) § 235 Home Ownership for Lower Income Families 
This section simply established a program of home ownership assistance by making 
mortgage amortization payments to mortgagors on behalf of home owners who qualified 
for assistance. Id. § 1715z(a)(l) (1982). Assisted home owners paid a minimum of 20% of 
their income for mortgage amortization. Id. § 1715z(c)(l) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Mort-
gage amortization payments to mortgagees on behalf of the home owner covered the dif-
ference between amortization at the FHA-insured interest rate and the amortization at 
an interest rate of one percent. Id. § 1715z(c)(2) (1982). Preference was given under the 
section to families likely to be displaced without such assistance. Id. § 1715z(a)(l) (1982). 
(c) § 236 Rental and Cooperative Housing for Lower Income Families 
To reduce rentals for lower income families, this provision authorized the Secretary to 
make mortgage amortization payments to mortgagors holding mortgages meeting the re-
quirements of the section. These payments were made on behalf of owners of rental 
housing projects designed for lower income tenants. Id. § 1715z-l(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986) Assisted renters paid the owner a minimum of 25% of their income for rent. Id. § 
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government first attempted to reduce the cost of producing sub-
sidized housing and to eliminate the direct involvement of a 
public instrumentality with the Housing Act of 1959.94 Section 
202 of the Act provided below market interest rate loans to non-
profit corporations (rather than local housing authorities) to de-
velop housing for the elderly and handicapped.911 These corpora-
tions constructed 45,000 units before an executive order by 
President Nixon in 1973 suspended the program along with all 
other contemporaneous federal housing programs. 98 When sec-
tion 202 was revived by Congress in 1974, its reach was limited 
by excluding elderly and handicapped persons who were not low 
income.97 
The next step was to replace direct loans with loan insurance. 
Section 221 of the National Housing Act, established by legisla-
tive amendment in 1961, was a mortgage insurance program 
analogous to that of the FHA.98 The section 221 program was 
directed at multifamily rental housing for displaced and moder-
ate income persons, rather than single-family housing for middle 
income owner occupants. This program included features that 
distinguished it from FHA insurance, however. Section 221(d)(3) 
carried a government agreement to purchase section 221(d)(3) 
mortgages on moderate income rental properties immediately af-
ter they were originated, making the program very close to a di-
1715z-1(0(1) (1982). Mortgage amortization payments to mortgagees on behalf of the 
landlord covered the difference between amortization at the FHA-insured interest rate 
and amortization at an interest rate of one percent. Id. § 1715z-l(c). 
94. Pub. L. No. 86-372, 73 Stat. 654 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). 
95. Id. § 202, 73 Stat. at 667-69 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986)). The nonprofit corporations acted as sponsors and subcontracted the actual con-
struction and financial packaging to developers. The section 202 program is the only 
survivor of Reagan's decimation of HUD's housing program. See generally R. Shiffman, 
supra note 37. 
96. This moratorium was part of Nixon's "Phase 3" austerity campaign to cut the 
federal budget. See Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 851 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Weems 
v. Pierce, 534 F. Supp. 740, 741 (C.D. Ill. 1982). The moratorium was overturned by 
court order with respect to § 236, § 202 was revived by Congress, and § 23 was replaced 
by§ 8 rental housing assistance through the 1974 Housing Act. NAHB, supra note 1, at 
5. 
97. A portion of§ 8 funds was correspondingly earmarked for§ 202 housing. Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II, §§ 201-213, 88 
Stat. 633, 653-76 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.); 
Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 126. For a discussion of the § 8 program, see infra 
note 132 and accompanying text. 
98. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, tit. I,§ 101, 75 Stat. 149, 149-54 (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 17151, 1715n, 1720 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Section lOl(a) 
added § 221(d)(3) to the National Housing Act (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1982 
& Supp. IV 1986). Before the 1961 Act, moderate income persons fell into the 20% gap 
between public and private housing. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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rect federal loan both in concept and expense. 99 Section 
221(d)(5) established a program of below market interest rate 
mortgages for owners of apartments renting to families with in-
comes below the median for the standard metropolitan statisti-
cal area.100 Developers constructed 400,000 rental units under 
the auspices of section 221.101 
The next step was taken with the Housing and Urban Devel-
opment Act of 1968, 102 a piece of legislation spurred by urban 
riots. 103 The 1968 Act expanded the federal government's finan-
cial commitment in the short run, but further reduced its struc-
tural involvement in housing supply. Not only had the govern-
ment now retreated from direct housing construction and direct 
mortgage lending, but the automatic purchase of section 221 
loans was superseded by a commitment to assist in mortgage in-
terest payments only. The 1968 Act proposed that twenty-six 
million new units of housing be produced over ten years, six mil-
lion of the total to be subsidized for low and moderate income 
persons by the federal government. The government was com-
mitted to aid nonprofit sponsors only by servicing the mortgage 
debt in an amount sufficient to reduce the interest rate to three 
percent, not by purchasing the mortgage or by making the loan 
itself. Section 235 was added to the National Housing Act to es-
tablish a low down payment (as low as $200), below market in-
terest rate (as low as three percent) home ownership loan pro-
gram for moderate income families. 1°' Section 236 created a 
multifamily rental program for families falling into the twenty 
percent gap between public and private housing.105 Both pro-
grams were suspended during the 1973 moratorium,106 however, 
and the housing gap identified in 1968 was not filled. Of the as-
sistance programs originated in the 1960's, only section 236 was 
99. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 125. 
100. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);_ see Milgram, Housing, supra 
note 73, at 126. 
101. NAHB, supra note 1, at 33. 
102. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). 
103. The Kerner Commission declared that lack of affordable housing was one of the 
key factors in the riots of the 1960's. NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 80-81 (1968). 
104. Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. I, § lOl(a), 82 Stat. 477 (1968) (adding § 235 to Pub. L. 
No. 75-13, tit. II, 52 Stat. 8, 9-23 (1938) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986)); see supra note 93. 
105. Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. II, § 201(a), 82 Stat. 498 (1968) (adding § 236 to Pub. L. 
No. 75-13, tit. II, 52 Stat. 8, 9-23 (1938) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1986)); see supra note 93. 
106. See supra note 96. 
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revived, in emasculated form, by the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974.107 
Sections 221(d)(3), 235, and 236 combined to produce 2.7 mil-
lion units of assisted housing in the ten years after 1968-a 
great, but very expensive, achievement.108 Assisted housing pro-
duction fell short of the original six million unit goal, but this 
shortfall was arguably caused in part by the 1973 moratorium.109 
Assisted housing starts had actually increased between 1970 and 
1973.110 
B. Demand-Side Techniques 
Supply-side techniques to house both middle income and 
lower income Americans have fallen on hard times since the ad-
vent of national housing policy in the 1930's. This Article now 
turns to an investigation of the fate of demand-side techniques 
during this same period. 
1. Tax deductions for middle income persons- The largest 
single subsidy to middle class home ownership-indeed to all 
housing, regardless of income class or tenure pattern-is a de-
mand-side subsidy.111 The subsidy, ·a deduction from federal 
taxes for interest paid on home mortgage loans, artificially 
107. Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II,§§ 201-213, 88 Stat. 633, 653-76 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). Section 236 mortgages for multifamily 
housing have been further leveraged by the activities of the GNMA on the secondary 
mortgage market. For a discussion of the role of the GNMA vis-a-vis other secondary 
mortgage market institutions such as the FNMA and the FHLMC, see supra notes 46-50 
and accompanying text. See also Fox v. HUD, 532 F. Supp. 540, 541-42 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
Proceeding in the public sector, and without the desirable portfolio of the FNMA and 
the FHLMC, the GNMA sought to make its loans more attractive on the secondary mar-
ket by pooling them and issuing so-called "pass-through" certificates, or "Ginnie Maes." 
Ginnie Maes carry a full faith and credit federal guarantee that debt service payments 
will be met in a timely fashion, regardless of the fate of the primary mortgage invest-
ments underlying the security. Investors take no responsibility for origination, servicing, 
or risk of loss. The Ginnie Maes are actually less risky than the underlying primary 
loans, and the Ginnie Maes have become fairly attractive on the securities market de-
spite relatively low yields. See generally Miles, supra note 4, at 88. 
108. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 128 (federal budget outlays increased to 
$1.0 billion by 1972 and were increasing at the rate of $0.5 billion per year). 
109. Only 59,000 new units were constructed under section 235, for example. Id. at 
129. 
110. See Administration Housing Moratorium Comes Under Fire, 29 CONGRESSIONAL 
QUARTERLY INc., 1973 ALMANAC 428, 430 (quoting James T. Lyon, Secretary of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development). 
111. On federal subsidies to middle income housing (including tax subsidies) and tax 
treatment of low income housing development, see Hoeflich & Malloy, supra note 23, at 
659-63. See also discussion of low income housing tax credits infra note 118. 
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boosts middle class buying power in owner-occupied housing. 
Moreover, this subsidy becomes more valuable as income 
increases. 112 
The mortgage interest deduction skews national investment 
drastically toward owner-occupied housing-at the expense of 
investment in more socially productive uses.113 Such a policy 
would be considered an impermissible extravagance in most of 
the developed, let alone underdeveloped, world. The Tax Code 
since World War II has constantly been revised to undo such 
skewing by making investment in industry more attractive rela-
tive to investment in owner-occupied housing. 114 As a result of 
such changes in the law, the after-tax return on owner-occupied 
housing has declined significantly since 1950 compared to invest-
ment in business or industry. m Today, it is no longer clear that 
owner-occupied housing is heavily favored by tax subsidies rela-
tive to capital investment in business or industry. 116 The Tax 
112. Schussheim, supra note 10, at 21 (in 1982, the average tax reduction for middle 
income home owners in the $20,000 to $30,000 income range was $600, but $3500 for 
taxpayers with incomes over $100,000). Only 37% of American households itemize de-
ductions, while 67 % are owner-occupiers. B. Bartlett, Federal Income Tax Reform: Re-
suming the Battle 11 (Report of Heritage Found. Dec. 30, 1986). It has been estimated 
that removal of all special tax breaks for homeownership would allow for a 10% across 
the board reduction in tax rates. Thus the majority of owner-occupiers would benefit by 
elimination of the deduction rather than being hurt by it. Id. 
113. Home ownership is treated for tax deductions as if it were a business but not 
treated as a business when it comes to taxing its value. The key is to recognize that the 
enjoyment of owner-occupied housing is, in effect, the enjoyment of value created by 
ownership. Elsewhere in the tax system, value created by ownership of a business asset is 
taxed at ordinary income rates. The Tax Code presently makes interest paid for money 
to buy a home deductible from taxable income, just as a business might deduct similar 
interest payments used to purchase a business asset. Although the income of such a busi-
ness would be taxed, however, the enjoyment-value, or "imputed income" generated by 
ownership of a home, is not taxed. Gravelle, Tax Subsidies to Housing 1953-83, in Hous-
ING-A READER, supra note 1, at 73, 73; see, e.g., B. Bartlett, supra note 112, at 10-11 
(deduction for home mortgage interest encourages excessive home ownership at the ex-
pense of using capital for business investment, thereby reducing United States produc-
tivity and international competitiveness). 
114. Note that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has initiated a schedule by which capital 
gain rates will be increased steadily over the next three years, a policy which will delete-
riously affect investment in housing and business assets alike. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 
Stat. 2085, 2216-19 (codified at I.R.C. l(j) (1986)); see also Schussheim, U.S. Housing: 
Problems and Prospects, in Report Prepared for the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban 
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Jan. 29, 1987, at 
CRS-9 (Congressional Research Paper). 
115. Gravelle, supra note 113, at 87-88. 
116. Increases in corporate taxes resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will sim-
ply restore the corporate share of federal taxes to their pre-Reagan levels-13% of all 
taxes. Corporate taxes made up only 8.5% of all tax revenues in 1985. Low Income Hous. 
Information Serv., Low Income Housing Round-up, Jan. 1986, at 3. In the 1950's and 
1960's, corporate taxes made up 20% of all federal taxes, and even after a round of 
corporate tax cuts, held at 15% of all federal taxes. Id. 
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Code has also made investment in tax-free accumulation of 
wealth through various pension plans increasingly attractive rel-
ative to investment in owner-occupied housing.117 
With rapid depreciation write-offs for investment in low in-
come housing already eliminated, us the largest single item of 
federal subsidy to the nonindustrial private sector-the deduc-
tion for home mortgage interest payments-is an attractive tar-
get in the game of "balance the budget."119 Although well-publi-
117. Independent Retirement Accounts (IRA's) in particular are attractive alterna-
tives to investment in owner-occupied housing, although at the same time they are ironi-
cally regarded by S & L's as a source of funds for mortgage lending. Gravelle, supra note 
113, at 94. 
118. Changes in tax laws inhibiting low income housing development are contained in 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit. I, § 111, 98 Stat. 494, 631-32 
(1984) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 168(j), 7701(e) (1986)). See Comment, Low-Income Housing 
Under the New Conservatism: Trickle Down or Dry Up?, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 461, 
462 n.8 (1986). For example, the rapid depreciation write-offs provided by § 167(k) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to investors in low income housing projects, such as those 
developed under § 221(d)(3) and § 236 of the National Housing Act of 1934, have been 
drastically limit,ed. I.R.C. § 167(k)(2) (1986). Under the old law, investment vehicles 
called real estate syndications were assembled to insulate limited partners from develop-
ment risk while allowing pass-through of tax write-offs. These vehicles were very popular 
in the days of high tax rates. The program was phased out then temporarily revived in 
1980 by the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). ACRS was established to restore 
tax shelter syndications as a way of developing low income rental housing, but this (as 
well as other "passive" losses) was drastically cut by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See 
I.R.C. § 167 (1986). Surviving tax incentives are low income housing tax credits, id. § 42, 
and tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds, id. § 143. See Callison, New Tax Credit for 
Low-Income Housing Provides Investment Incentives, 66 J. TAx'N. 100 (1987). 
The new low income housing investment tax credit of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is 
focused on making a stricter correlation between the subsidies given and the number of 
units in a project that house low income tenants. Specifically required by the act are: (1) 
a minimum number of units in a project that houses low income tenants, (2) a limited 
rent to be charged to those tenants, and (3) a direct relation to be established between 
the subsidy given and units available. 
The credit itself is a general business credit to be claimed in equal amounts over a ten-
year period. The amount equals the product of the taxpayer's qualified basis in the prop-
erty and the applicable credit rate. The qualified basis is determined by multiplying the 
eligible basis of the property by the lesser of the fraction of the number of low income 
units in the project over total units or the amount of floor space of low income units over 
the floor space of all units. This computation provides a basis that directly relates the 
credit given to the amount of space occupied by the low income tenant. 
The applicable credit rate is a more complex determination. Depending upon whether 
the project is federally subsidized or not, the credit rate is determined such that the 
aggregate credit amounts to a percentage of the basis attributable to low income units. 
For nonfederally subsidized projects the percentage is 70% and for federally subsidized 
projects the percentage is 30%. See generally I.R.C. § 42 (1986); infra note 275. 
119. President Reagan's commitment to maintain defense spending and lower taxes, 
despite his severe slashing of domestic programs, has created a monumental deficit in 
the American economy-the National Debt has climbed to one trillion dollars since he 
took office in 1980. The housing budget has taken the biggest cuts, reduced by 50% from 
its 1979 level. Every housing program conceived since 1933, with the exceptions of public 
housing and section 202 housing for the elderly and handicapped, has been eliminated. 
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cized skirmishes over this deduction have been fought, and 
always lost by its opponents, the very phenomenon of tax rate 
reduction is rendering the deduction less important to the tax-
payer and the government. 
Since 1969, declining tax rates have made the deduction for 
home mortgage interest payments less attractive to middle class 
persons while the value of the standard deduction has increased 
relatively and in absolute terms for low and moderate income 
persons.120 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduces the highest 
marginal tax rate to twenty-eight percent beginning in 1988. At 
marginal tax rates of twenty-five percent or less, the standard 
deduction is a superior tax-saving vehicle to itemized deductions 
for home mortgage interest, and the home owner who elects to 
itemize deductions foregoes the standard deduction. 121 By 1980, 
the average American122 who did not own his or her own home 
gained no tax advantage by itemizing. Thus, the value of tax 
subsidies has gone down as the standard deduction has in-
creased and as tax rates have decreased.123 These trends have 
made the tax subsidy valuable to an increasingly smaller, more 
affluent sector of the population.12' 
Emerging Consensus Policy, supra note 86, at 1. Current thinking on Capitol Hill, as 
evidenced by the revised Graham-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Law signed into 
law by the President on September 29, 1987, holds that to balance the budget without 
raising taxes, both defense and domestic spending must be cut; if only one is cut, taxes 
cannot be cut as well. The result of this formula, at the very least, is that even though 
tax rates are unlikely to be raised again, tax loopholes will be closed and tax deductions 
reduced or eliminated. 
120. A Heritage Foundation report demonstrates that only a small percentage of 
home owners actually itemize. See B. Bartlett, supra note 112. The top tax bracket de-
creased from 89% for 1954 to 70% in 1966 and to 50% in 1981. Gravelle, supra note 113, 
at 83. 
121. Gravelle, supra note 113, at 92. 
122. The average American earns Jess than $27,500 per year (55% of the population). 
See supra note 71. 
123. The new tax code significantly increased the highest standard deduction from 
$3760 in 1987 to $5000 in 1988. The law also pegs the deduction in future years to infla-
tion, so it will rise steadily. I.RC. § 63(e)(2)(A) (1986). · 
124. Even before these changes, taxpayers making $100,000 per year or more seemed 
to benefit most from the deduction for mortgage interest payments. Schussheim, supra 
note 10, at 21. Changes effected by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will make it less attrac-
tive as a tax matter for even middle income persons to own their own homes. See, e.g., 
supra note 123 (increase in size of standard deduction when coupled with a decrease in 
overall tax rate reduces the marginal utility of itemizing deductions rather than choosing 
a standard deduction). Deductions for home mortgage interest payments are the largest 
single item deduction for most taxpayers. Many middle income persons cannot afford 
home ownership without a tax subsidy attached. The presence or absence of mortgage 
interest deductions is dispositive in the decision to own or rent. Gravelle, supra note 113, 
at 92-93. 
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Home ownership is becoming a luxury rather than a tax shel-
ter. The huge financing charges now associated with home own-
ership are no longer supportable at marginal tax rates of twenty-
five percent or less. As the tax rates drop further, the financing 
industry may well be faced with a rash of defaults. 
2. Transfer payments for lower income persons- The lack 
of affordable housing at low and moderate income levels, just as 
at higher income levels, is a function of the disparity between 
housing cost and consumer resources. Supply-side remedies are 
costly, though the cost is small when compared to the expense of 
mortgage interest deductions.1211 Perhaps for this reason, tech-
niques to bolster consumer buying power for lower income per-
sons, rather than supply-side production techniques, have be-
come increasingly popular among policymakers. 126 
Assisted housing projects, like public housing, often have had 
difficulty meeting operating expenses.127 Although the federal 
government has subsidized construction in the past, the gap be-
tween tenant income and the rent needed for operating expenses 
continues to increase due to inflation and a variety of other fac-
tors. Such circumstances have compelled the federal government 
to move to the demand side by supplementing the incomes of 
tenants of assisted housing rather than continuing to expend 
large sums in housing production.128 
Some section 236 projects proved very difficult to manage; as 
operating costs increased and tenant rents stayed the same, 
some section 236 projects defaulted on their mortgage loans, 
125. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
126. For a discussion of § 23 housing leasing, see infra note 130 and accompanying 
text. For a discussion of § 8 housing, see infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
Housing assistance payments are direct cash transfers targeted to low income individu-
als. Milgram, supra note 3, at 109. Moderate income persons have been excluded from 
such transfers in the name of efficiency even though the transfers are less costly than 
supply-side subsidies. The only programs aimed at moderate income consumers were the 
supply-side programs of the 1960's and early 1970's-§§ 221(d)(3), 235, 236. See supra 
note 93. 
127. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
128. Devices to bolster buying power usually take the form of a supplemental pay-
ment made to the tenant's landlord, but in some cases payments are made directly to the 
tenant. Such transfer payments have been increasingly targeted to the low end of the 
lower income spectrum, however, to reduce the number of subsidized persons and, hence, 
the costs. Combinations of all methods-supply- and demand-side-are often needed to 
reach lower income individuals. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 116-17. For exam-
ple, § 236 supply-side subsidies and § 8 demand side subsidies are often combined. Id. 
Because of the time involved in housing construction and rehabilitation, and in locating 
suitable units in the existing stock, housing production tends to lag behind capital au-
thorizations-in some cases for several years-creating the well-known "pipeline" effect. 
See id. at 120. 
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prompting FHA foreclosure. 129 The section 23 public housing 
leasing program, designed to provide scattered site and lower 
public housing, was also used to help section 221(d)(5) projects, 
and later, section 236 projects, stay afloat by filling vacancies.130 
The funds came from LHA annual contributions contract 
awards, enabling the LHA's to lease section 221(d)(5) and sec-
tion 236 units for tenants of public housing. The next step to-
ward the demand side was taken in 1965, when rent supple-
ments were established to pay section 221(d)(5) and section 236 
project managers the difference between the contract rent and 
twenty-five percent of a tenant's income.131 
Section 8, the closest thing to an exclusively demand-side 
technique established before the Reagan administration, was 
created by the Housing and Community Development Act of 
197 4. 132 Section 8 funds could be used for direct payments to 
landlords of existing housing133 but could also be used to service 
129. See, e.g., Daniels v. HUD, 518 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
130. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 126-27 (discussing § 23 public housing leas-
ing program created by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965); see also id. at 
127 (HUD ruling counting newly constructed units as "existing" for the purposes of the 
subsidy enabled § 23 to be used as a means of supply-side housing production). One 
hundred seventy thousand units were built under this ruling before § 23 was suspended 
under the Nixon moratorium. NAHB, supra note 1, at 34. Section 23 was replaced by § 8 
rental housing assistance through the 1974 Housing Act. For a description of § 8, see 
infra note 132. 
131. The Rent Supplement Program is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701(s) (Supp. IV 
1986). Rent supplements were 40-year contracts, later converted to the so-called "deep 
subsidy program" for projects built pursuant to a § 236 contract after August 22, 1974. 
See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(0(2) (1982). For a good summary of the Rent Supplement pro-
gram, see Allen v. Pierce, 689 F.2d 593, 594-95 nn.1-4 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Section 236 projects also benefited from some operating subsidies (supply side). See, 
e.g., Allen, 689 F.2d at 595 n.2 (considering the "troubled projects" operating subsidy, 12 
U.S.C. § l 715z(l)(a) (1982)). Those projects that could not be saved by rent supple-
ments, deep subsidy, or operating subsidy were foreclosed. See supra note 129 and ac-
companying text; see also Ferrell v. Pierce, 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing HUD 
programs to avoid "precipitous" foreclosure of§ 236 project by mortgagees, to take as-
signments of § 236 project mortgages from mortgagees, and to make temporary assis-
tance payments to mortgagees on a § 236 project mortgagor's behalO. 
132. Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II, § 8, 88 Stat. 633, 663 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Under § 8, HUD is authorized to make payments to 
owners and prospective owners of existing dwellings to assist lower income families in 
finding a place to live. Section 8, an amendment to the United States Housing Act of 
1937, is essentially designed as an adjunct to or substitute for public housing. Section 8 
was a very successful program, producing more low income housing in five years than 
public housing has produced in 40 years. 50th Anniversary of the 1937 Housing Act: 
History as Inspiration for the Future, HOUSING AFF. LETTER, June 19, 1987, at 9, 10 
[hereinafter 50th Anniversary]; see supra notes 97, 126, and 130. For further discussion 
of § 8, see Landrieu & McGrew, HUD: The Federal Catalyst for Urban Revitalization, 
55 TuL. L. REv. 637 (1981). 
133. This decreased the LHA's role a step beyond § 23 leasing, in which the LHA, 
not the subsidized family, entered into a lease with the owner. Interview with Diane 
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debt for the construction of new housing or the substantial reha-
bilitation of existing dwellings.184 In either event, the payments 
were made by the local HUD office. Section 8 entails regulation 
by local HUD officials of maximum rent levels paid (thirty per-
cent of the tenant's income) and minimum standards of habita-
bility. Officials are empowered to deny funds where the regula-
tions are not heeded. The program has been increasingly 
targeted towards the very low income in recent years. 1811 
Section 8 was expected to reduce federal outlays, but the two 
million units for which section 8 reservations were made186 ap-
parently did not cut costs enough to suit the administration. 187 
By fiscal year 1983, the Reagan administration had phased out 
the new construction and substantial rehabilitation programs 
and had begun a practice of issuing section 8 "existing housing" 
contracts for very short terms, two to five years, instead of the 
fifteen year average that was characteristic of the Carter 
administration.138 
The Reagan administration has recently proposed lessening 
the federal contribution even more, by further narrowing the 
range of tenants served and transforming section 8 into a de-
mand-side program entirely, by using housing voucher certifi-
cates to make payments directly to tenants.139 The President's 
Dorius, Chief Counsel, House Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
Washington, D.C. (July 27, 1987) [hereinafter Dorius Interview]. The subsidy was the 
difference between the contract rent and 30% of the tenant's income. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1437a(a), 1437f(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also Johnson v. Sound View Apart-
ments, 585 F. Supp. 559, 560 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
134. Advance commitments for subsidy payments could be used by developers seek-
ing conventional financing or financing by state housing mortgage finance agencies (such 
as those existing in Virginia). See, e.g., Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 
1982). Such projects, however, were never favored over§ S's existing (or even substantial 
rehabilitation) housing programs (subsidies for one million units of existing and substan-
tially rehabilitated housing, out of a total of 2.2 million units, were planned as of 1984). 
Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 131. Both existing and rehabilitation programs have 
the virtue of recycling existing housing stock and allegedly broadening consumer choice. 
Id. Section 8 existing and substantial rehabilitation programs have allegedly operated to 
discourage dispersal of low income and minority tenants outside of their existing com-
munities, however. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 
F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1982). 
135. "Very low income" refers to persons whose income is 50% or less of the median 
income for the standard metropolitan statistical area. See supra note 71. 
136. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 131. Half of these units are occupied by the 
elderly. 
137. See, e.g., City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(suit to reverse President's impoundment of § 8 funds). 
138. Dorius Interview, supra note 133. 
139. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 134-37. Housing vouchers are a direct pay-
ment to tenants to augment their bidding power for private housing. Without rent con-
trol and housing code enforcement, however, housing vouchers can cause rents to in-
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Commission on Housing in 1983 recommended that housing 
vouchers, targeted to the very lowest income consumers, be sub-
stituted for all other forms of low and moderate income housing 
assistance, on the grounds that the problem was not supply, but 
rather affordability, and that supply-side subsidies to foster new 
construction were unnecessary, inappropriate, and unduly ex-
pensive. 140 New construction, under this proposal, would become 
more a responsibility of local government, executed with some 
federal assistance through community development block grants, 
the guidelines for which would be altered to include housing de-
velopment as a permissible use for the funds. m The results of a 
1983 voucher experiment sponsored by the administration were 
used to support arguments that this approach was feasible. 142 
C. The Current State of Affordable Housing 
Housing credit markets have changed significantly since the 
New Deal. From the 1960's to the late 1970's, housing, both 
"private"143 and assisted, had a high social priority. Prior to the 
Reagan era, for example, S & L's, the cornerstone of middle class 
crease and quality to deteriorate-people simply pay more for the inadequate housing in 
which they already live. Fair housing regulation is also necessary to ensure that vouchers 
do not perpetuate housing segregation. See id. at 135, 137. 
An experiment by the Equal .Housing Access Project in 1984 found that large minority 
families had particular difficulty in finding suitable housing with vouchers. Youmans In-
terview, supra note 91. 
140. In 1982, the President's Commission on Housing articulated the analytical 
framework of Reagan's agenda: (1) fiscal responsibility and monetary stability, (2) de-
regulated housing markets, (3) reliance on the private sector, (4) minimize federal inter-
vention on the local level, (5) stay in the business of housing the poor, (6) direct pro-
grams toward people rather than structures (demand subsidy rather than supply sub-
sidy), and (7) assure maximum housing choice. THE PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N ON Hous .. 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING xviii (1982) [hereinafter COMMIS-
SION REPORT]. 
The 1977 annual housing survey reported that more than 62% of very low income 
renters paid more than 30% of their incomes for rent while only 19% occupied substan-
dard housing. COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 11; see also Milgram, Housing, supra note 
73, at 136. 
141. See Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 137, for a discussion of housing devel-
opment block grants. Housing development block grants are similar to community devel-
opment grants, but are used to finance new construction or substantial rehabilitation of 
residential property. 
142. The President's Commission on Housing recommends the consumer-oriented 
housing assistance grant as the cornerstone of the Reagan administration housing policy. 
Nolon, supra note 22, at 250; see also supra notes 139-40. 
143. "Private" housing is a misnomer describing housing that is government assisted 
through indirect subsidies, such as tax deductions for home mortgage interest and the 
operation of such agencies as the FNMA on the secondary mortgage market. 
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home ownership, enjoyed a protected status vis-a-vis commercial 
banks. This status has recently been eroded. 
In the early 1980's, inflation and soaring interest rates played 
havoc with S & L's that had invested heavily in low-yield, long-
term, fixed-rate mortgages. 144 Congress passed legislation au-
thorizing the S & L's to diversify their assets, take more risks, 
and loosen their links to housing. 1• 11 
Deregulation of the nation's S & L's has made the housing in-
dustry even more vulnerable to fluctuations in interest rates, 
however. Some S & L's have emerged stronger and more compet-
itive, but many more have been crippled or destroyed. Further-
more, deregulation of S & L's means that all housing consumers, 
including those of middle income, compete for capital with 
nonhousing consumers; commercial concerns; industry; and fed-
eral, state, and local government. 
In addition to these factors, the value of tax deductions for 
mortgage interest has changed significantly. Middle income 
housing consumers investigating. the option of home ownership, 
particularly first time buyers, must now weigh carefully acquisi-
tion costs, interest rates, utility charges, the deductibility of ex-
penses, and expected capital gains. The availability of funds for 
housing increasingly depends directly on the state of the econ-
omy and those federal fiscal and monetary policies that affect 
interest rates. 146 Direct government actions are impeded by pres-
sures to balance the budget as well as a declining economy. As a 
144. This particular mortgage device was initiated during the Depression under the 
Roosevelt administration as a way of preventing the financial crises occasioned by short-
term mortgages with balloon notes, which had contributed to the stock market crash 
when banks refused to refinance them. A complex administrative and regulatory struc-
ture was set up to facilitate financial recovery and stability, the most important institu-
tions being the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The FSLIC has been 
tapped to the limit by recent bank failures and a law was recently passed to recapitalize 
the FSLIC as a consequence. See infra notes 235-47 and accompanying text. 
145. See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Decontrol Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 15 
U.S.C.); Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 
Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C. & 
42 U.S.C.). Deregulation means S & L's act more like mortgage bankers or commercial 
banks. Deregulation means S & L's will use insured funds in risky ventures and also 
means that S & L's will be competing for business with some of the housing firms upon 
whose credit they must pass. NAHB, supra note 1, at 62; see also supra notes 56-67 and 
accompanying text. 
146. Federal policy in the tax and program financing areas is being based upon the 
assumption that other lenders-mutual savings banks, commercial banks, life insurance 
companies, mortgage pools, and secondary market facilities-will take a larger role in 
housing finance, filling the "credit gap." Meyerson, supra note 54, at 85-86. But see 
supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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•result, the government has found it difficult to finance the pro-
duction of housing needed by the entire population while carry-
ing the staggering cost of subsidizing private ownership of 
owner-occupied housing. 
With lower income housing, the problem is even greater-new 
construction is virtually closed as an option, and housing reha-
bilitation, the remaining alternative, is greatly curtailed by most 
-projects' inability to compete with other investment opportuni-
ties.147 The gradual withdrawal -of the government from subsi-
dized housing for lower income groups has taken place over 
thirty years. From public housing to subsidized housing, from 
direct loans to mortgage amortization, from payments to land-
lords to payments to tenants, from long-term subsidy contracts 
(fifteen years) to short-term subsidy contracts (three to five 
years), the pattern has been clear. The government has with-
drawn first from construction, then from lending, and finally 
from regulation. 
Added to the structural withdrawal of the federal government 
from housing are several immediate problems which exacerbate 
the shortage of funds for affordable housing. First, the supply of 
low income housing is dwindling while the number of people 
who cannot afford market rate housing is increasing. Second, the 
· institutions that support middle income home ownership are in 
an extremely weakened state. 
1. Low income housing- The subsidized multifamily hous-
ing of the 1960's was built by private developers pursuant to 
twenty-year mortgage contracts under Federal Housing Act sec-
tions 221 and 236, which required the owners to rent to persons 
of moderate income at prices they could afford. Those· contracts 
·are beginning to expire, and many of the multifamily dwellings 
in question are in "gentrifying" neighborhoods, where there is 
considerable demand for their use at market rates. 148 Within the 
next fifteen years, more than half of the 600,000 privately-
147. This is particularly true after the demise of tax syndications premised on the 
availability of "passive" losses. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., Jordan, Settlement Reached In Arlandria Suit, Wash. Post, June 16, 
1987, at Bl, col. 6 (describing the settlement reached between developers renovating low 
income housing for resale at market rents and the low income tenants they threatened to 
displace in the Arlandria Neighborhood, in Alexandria, Virginia. In this Arlandria dis-
pute, HUD agreed to furnish 348 § 8 vouchers and certificates and the city agreed to 
.furnish between $300,000 and $500,000 in rent subsidies. The developers, John Freeman 
and Conrad Cafritz, in an out of court settlement, agreed to set aside 68 apartments in 
the 275-unit complex at issue where the rent subsidies could be used. For a reported 
opinion on plaintiff's standing, see Brown v. Artery Organization, 654 F. Supp. 1106 
(D.D.C. 1987). 
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owned, federally subsidized apartments in the nation could be 
freed from the regulatory restraints that ensure their continued 
use as low and moderate income housing under sections 221 and 
236. 149 
It is clearly in the interest of the owners of such housing to 
refinance their mortgages, evict their moderate income tenants, 
and create market rate multifamily dwellings.1110 It is difficult to 
see how this process can be averted without additional, arguably 
unconstitutional, restrictions being placed on the private prop-
erty rights of these owners. Any action will certainly require 
compensation of such owners or renewed subsidies for the multi-
family projects, or both. At the same time, the Reagan adminis-
tration has made several efforts to sell section 221(d)(3) and sec-
tion 236 mortgages on the open market, further reducing the 
protection of low income project residents. m Most efforts have 
been rejected by Congress1112 or stalled by public interest law-
suits, however. 1113 
The other problem, alluded to above, is that the subsidized 
housing of the 1970's established in section 8 of the United 
States Housing Act (new construction, substantial rehabilitation, 
and existing housing programs) involved fifteen- and twenty-
year contracts between the federal and local governments, 
through which the federal government provided funds to subsi-
dize the purchasing power of low income tenants in private 
149. Mariano, HUD Will Delay Its Loan Sales, Wash. Post, June 2, 1987, at D7, col. 
3. 
150. See infra note 184; see also Brown, 654 F. Supp. at 1117. 
151. HUD is proceeding to sell $500 million worth of low income rental housing mort-
gages at dii,counts as great as 20% off unpaid balances. Some of the mortgages in ques-
tion are federally insured loans that HUD took over after the property owners defaulted, 
and others are loans made by the Department in order to sell properties it had taken 
back after previous defaults. In most cases, low income residents of the buildings will not 
be protected against rent increases after the sales. Mariano, supra note 149, at D7, col. 3. 
152. The House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development urged the 
GNMA to refrain from selling subsidized mortgages until a solution to the problem of 
tenant displacement has been found. Four hundred ten million dollars of § 221(d)(3) 
mortgages was involved. Hovic Panel Backs Delay in GNMA Loan Sale, HousING AFF. 
LETTER, May 1, 1987, at 8. 
153. One such lawsuit was brought by the National Housing Law Project (NHLP) in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asking the court 
to issue a temporary restraining order preventing the evictions. Sale of the mortgages 
would have removed the buildings from HUD's regulatory oversight and tenants would 
have lost important protections that they now enjoy because of federal involvement with 
the property. Telephone interview with Catherine Bishop, Attorney for the National 
Housing Law Project, Washington, D.C. The NHLP successfully sued for a restraining 
order in federal district court in California. Walker v. Pierce, 665 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
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housing that met federal standards. 1114 Since the beginning of the 
Reagan administration, the section 8 new construction and sub-
stantial rehabilitation programs have been eliminated and con-
tracts for section 8 existing housing have been issued for increas-
ingly shorter periods.1H As a result, outstanding contracts for 
section 8 housing are either expiring or are on very short terms, 
and a massive outpouring of funds will soon be necessary to 
maintain existing commitments. 
The federally subsidized housing programs of the 1980's, of-
fered to replace those of the 1960's and 1970's, rest on housing 
voucher contracts with local governments. The voucher program 
is similar to section 8, but there are two important differences. 
First, the quality· of housing is not monitored and a higher per-
centage of the tenant's income is available for rent. It was re-
cently revealed that low income tenants are paying unacceptably 
high rents under this program, often for substandard accommo-
dations. 166 Second, voucher contracts are for very short terms, 
making them unsuitable as anchors for long-term mortgage fi-
nancing for the development of low income housing. Congress 
has halted further expansion of the voucher program, and will 
return to the section 8 program in the interim.167 
Public housing, the oldest and most durable of the subsidized 
programs, has foundered on social problems endemic to its loca-
tions in depressed, inner city neighborhoods. 166 Efforts to inte-
grate such housing have been challenged by the Reagan adminis-
tration, 169 and efforts to locate public housing in better 
neighborhoods have failed except for experiments in such cities 
as Baltimore, Maryland, and Newport News, Virginia. 16° Con-
gress has generally stymied efforts by the Reagan administration 
154. Dorius Interview, supra note 133. 
155. Id. 
156. See supra note 139. 
157. Present provisions in the H.R. 4 conference bill require 15-year contracts for§ 8 
certificates under the HUD Loan Management program, prohibiting the use of vouchers 
under the program. Further Progress Made in Resolving Issues, Hous1NG AFF. LETTER, 
Oct. 23, 1987, at 5, 6. 
158. See supra note 89. 
159. HOUSING AFF. LE'ITER, July 24, 1987, at 8. 
160. The option of tenant management and ownership of existing public housing may 
be worth pursuing. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 conceives of 
a public housing sale program whereby a residential management corporation (RMC) 
may purchase public housing units as co-ops or under other ownership forms. The RMC 
would first have to demonstrate its ability to manage the property for at least three 
years, with resale price restrictions required. Public housing projects could also simply be 
converted to tenant management, with RMC's receiving operating subsidies and modern-
ization funds ordinarily available to local housing authorities. The decreasing viability of 
privately owned, assisted housing has increased the importance of the existing public 
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to sell existing public housing units, but tenant abuse, lack of 
maintenance, and lack of funds have taken their toll on existing 
public housing and little more is being built. 
2. Middle income housing- The amount of affordable hous-
ing for middle income persons has declined primarily due to in-
terest rate increases, but also due to local growth controls and 
reductions in the viability of income tax deductions for home 
mortgage interest payments. S & L's, the mainstay of the home 
mortgage finance industry, have been severely buffeted by dis-
intermediation and unwise investments. The FSLIC, which 
shores up these institutions, is on the verge of bankruptcy. The 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, responsible for pruning ineffi-
cient S & L's, is hampered in this endeavor by the scarcity of 
FSLIC funds with which to ease sick S & L's out of business. 
The result is that the S & L's that are in trouble sink deeper and 
healthy S & L's seek to leave the system, join the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, and become commercial banks. 
Generally speaking, pension funds, insurance companies, and 
other institutions that might conceivably bridge the resulting 
home financing credit gap have not moved into the breach. 
3. The Reagan "revolution" in national housing policy161-
The Reagan housing agenda has been "to reduce federal spend-
ing and housing regulation, transfer authority to states and lo-
calities, emphasize private initiatives and provide needy families 
with direct payments, in the form of housing vouchers, to find 
their own housing. "162 These goals have been realized; housing 
starts are down to Depression levels and federal funds for hous-
ing have been cut seventy percent since 1980.163 Market condi-
tions, tax reform, and budget cuts over the past six years have 
eliminated nearly all new construction of housing for the poor. 164 
The effect of the Reagan housing program is graphically illus-
trated by the growth in the number of homeless persons during 
his administration to a figure unparalleled since the Depres-
housing stock that provides shelter for 1.35 million families. P. CLAY. AT RISK OF Loss 15 
(1987). 
161. For a brief overview of federal housing policy in the early 1980's, see Brownstein 
& Love, Cracks in the Foundation of Federal Assistance to Housing, 10 J. LEGIS. 297 
(1983); Special White Center Project, Federal Budget Cuts in Housing: Is There No 
Place Like a Decent Home?, 10 J. LEGIS. 457, 467-69 (1983). 
162. NAHB, supra note 1, at 37; see supra note 139. 
163. Interest rates, which spiraled upward in the early 1980's, have already begun to 
rise again as the value of the dollar falls against the currency of healthier economies. For 
a discussion of the economic changes of the 1980's, see Comment, supra note 118, at 462-
67 (1986). See also supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text. 
164. Mariano, supra note 149, at D7, col. 3. 
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sion-perhaps as many as three million people. m The lack of 
affordable housing is the single most important factor in a vari-
ety of causes of homelessness. 166 The lack of affordable housing 
has become more extreme, primarily because of reductions in 
federally assisted housing programs, 167 but also because of such 
diverse factors as exclusionary zoning, 168 gentrification, 169 and 
165. Compare the figures of the Center for Creative Non-violence, approximately 3 
million people, with HUD's estimate of 250,000 people. HousE COMMITTEE ON Gov'T OP-
ERATIONS, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE HOMELESS CRISIS, H.R. REP. No. 47, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. 7 (1985) [hereinafter HOMELESS REPORT]. 
166. Other factors include massive deinstitutionalization of mental patients as part of 
a community "mainstreaming" effort that never got off the ground, rising inflation and 
unemployment, social service cutbacks, and the Reagan administration's aggressive trim-
ming of social service eligibility lists. In the last 20 years, hundreds of thousands of pa-
tients have been deinstitutionalized to receive treatment from community mental health 
centers. These facilities have not materialized in sufficient numbers to accommodate the 
need, often as a result of community opposition. Many deinstitutionalized patients reach 
the streets with no shelter, job training, or counseling services. Id. at 4. The National 
Institute of Mental Health estimates that 50% of the homeless may have severe mental 
disorders. Id. 
Inflation and unemployment were partially caused by historic transformations in 
American industry and the economy. Unemployment soared between 1979 and 1983 
from 5.8% to 9.5%. Business movements into high technology have transformed indus-
trial workers into unskilled people in need of retraining. From 1970 to 1980, 38 million' 
jobs were permanently lost due to deindustrialization of our economy. Id. at 5. 
Some of the cutbacks in social services eligibility lists were achieved by reexamining 
client eligibility in programs such as social security insurance, disability insurance, Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children, and food stamps. According to the Congressional 
Budget Office, the poverty rate in 1982 was 15%-its highest in 18 years-up from 
11.4 % in 1978; this added approximately eight million people "to the ranks of the poor. 
Budget reductions, plus the removal of beneficiaries through aggressive eligibility 
rechecking, pushed many poor people out into the streets. The absence of a fixed address 
can, in itself, result in disqualification from some social programs. The lack of a place to 
prepare food and the chaotic lifestyle of the homeless can also complicate securing fed-
eral assistance. Id. at 6, 20. 
167. Public Housing, § 8 Leased Housing, § 101 Rent Supplements, and § 236 Rental 
Housing are examples of programs that have been cut or eliminated during the first 
seven years of the Reagan administration. Dorius Interview, supra note 133. Public hous-
ing operating subsidies and § 202 loans for the elderly and handicapped are prime candi-
dates for keeping poor people from becoming homeless. HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 
165, at 22. Yet, while homelessness increased, HUD appropriations dropped from $1.3 
billion in 1979-four years after § 8 was adopted-to $636 million in fiscal year 1984. Id. 
at 23. 
168. See supra note 18. 
169. Conversion of single room occupancy (SRO) hotels to condominiums is a direct 
link to homelessness and gentrification. HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 165, at 6. The 
National Housing Law Project estimates that 2.5 million dwelling units have been lost 
due to revitalization projects. An additional 500,000 units are lost every year due to con-
versions, abandonment, inflation, arson, and demolition. Id. at 3; see also Tuttle, Jacobs 
& Stipp, Recent Developments in Housing and Community Development, 17 URB. LAW. 
797, 801-02 (1985). 
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increased demand for rental units by middle income persons 
pushed out of the housing ownership market.170 
Homelessness will increase as the low income housing stock 
deteriorates and federal programs for assisted housing and social 
service continue to shrink. in New policies to produce affordable 
housing within modern budget constraints must respond to the 
problem of homelessness.172 Possible sources of initiative include 
state and local governments and voluntary organizations.173 In 
fact, the Reagan administration's housing cutbacks in general 
seem to have been made upon the assumption that local govern-
ment and community organizations would pick up the slack. 
There is some limited precedent for this view. m 
Ill. REACTION AND RESPONSE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
Rapid urbanization and population growth accompanying the 
industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century first created 
intense demand at the local level for housing.175 Before the 
states stepped in during the early Depression years, local gov-
ernments had tried, and failed, to deal with housing problems. 
Before local governments got involved, charitable organizations 
of the early 1900's vainly but courageously confronted slum con-
ditions, the harsh negative fallout of urbanization. Such charita-
ble organizations were themselves developments that followed 
earlier efforts by voluntary organizations which served a certain 
faith or ethnic group.176 
A number of states experimented with housing production ini-
tiatives after World War I, including New York177 and Califor-
170. A District of Columbia City Council member has urged landlords of subsidized 
housing units to slow their evictions of undesirable tenants. The number of homeless in 
the city increased 500% in 1986, from 39 to 245 families. Wheeler, City Landlords Urged 
to Slow Eviction Rate, Wash. Post, June 2, 1987, at 82, col. 1. 
171. HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 165, at 23. 
172. / d. at 28-29. Some activity is ensuing at the local level. 
173. For example, the Alexandria City Council recently approved a city-funded 
shelter. 
174. For more on the role of local government, see Fernsler, Tuttle, Kessler, Kogan, 
Simons & Walsh, Historical Perspectives, Current Trends and Future Housing and 
Community Development, 16 URB. LAW. 683, 690-94 (1984) [hereinafter Fernsler & 
Tuttle]. 
175. Milgram, Housing, supra note 73, at 114. 
176. R. Shiffman, supra note 37, at 3. 
177. Id. at 4-5; 1926 N.Y. Laws 823. 
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nia.178 State governments also attempted to deal with the hous-
ing crisis of the Depression before calling in the federal 
government for assistance. Although the Depression made it 
necessary for the states to call on the federal government for a 
nationally coordinated policy and for national resources, 179 there 
has always been an impulse to return the problem to the local 
level, where the connections between housing and community 
development seem clearest. Housing must be considered in the 
context of infrastructure, employment, transportation, ameni-
ties, social and physical environment, and neighborhood life. All 
are matters of community concern because all interrelate in sys-
temic and organic fashion, particularly at the local level. 180 The 
following discussion explores historical and present techniques 
available to state and local governments and to voluntary orga-
nizations seeking to play a role in producing affordable housing. 
A. Federalism in National Housing Policy 
The United States Housing Act of 1937, connecting slum 
clearance with the development of public housing, was the first 
federal statute to make the connection between housing and 
community development an explicit one in a program aimed at 
state and local government.181 The Act initiated a program of 
massive federal intervention to provide decent, affordable hous-
ing for the working poor, using local housing authorities for im-
plementation. The Housing Act of 1949 linked a decent home 
with a suitable living environment for the middle class and gave 
localities broader powers to connect housing and environment at 
178. Veterans' Farm and Home Purchase Act of 1943, CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE§§ 984-
987.12 (West 1955) (current version at §§ 985-987.31 (West Supp. 1987)) (establishing 
bond financing to enable veterans to acquire farms and homes); R. Shiffman, supra note 
37, at 4. 
179. D. JUDD, supra note 1, at 133-34. 
180. See, e.g., Welborn, supra note 1, at 151-52 (citing an 1856 report of the New 
York Society for Improving the Conditions of the Poor, which detailed the negative im-
pact of slums and slum life on the surrounding community); see also D. JUDD, supra note 
1, at 33-34 (noting community-wide dangers of fire, pestilence, disease, lack of safe water 
supply, and lack of sanitation in crowded, low income, immigrant neighborhoods of large 
cities during the Industrial Revolution). 
181. Welborn, supra note 1, at 152. The United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. 
No. 75-412, § l0(a), 50 Stat. 888, 891-92 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437h (1982)) required a 
unit of slum housing to be eliminated for each unit of public housing created. This con-
nection, however, was made partly to appease private housing suppliers who feared gov-
ernment competition. D. JUDD, supra note 1 at 264. 
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all economic levels.182 Localities were authorized to engage in 
slum clearance and, through amendments in 1954, to engage in 
redevelopment activities known as "urban renewal."183 The 1954 
Urban Renewal amendments laid the blueprint for exercises not 
only in slum clearance, but aiso in land assembly for planned 
housing and C(!mmunity redevelopment. 
Because of the economic and social mixture of communities 
that could legally be served through urban renewal statutes, a 
fundamental issue in community development became "Which 
community is being served, and who represents it?," a telling 
question when set against the background of persons excluded 
from political participation by income, social class, and racial or-
igin. Between 1949 and 197 4, an ongoing tension existed be-
tween community development for the middle class and commu-
nity development for the poor, as municipal officials sought to 
attract middle class persons back from the suburbs by building 
attractive edifices atop the rubble of "cleared" slum neighbor-
hoods. Relocation of businesses and individuals displaced by ur-
ban redevelopment-whether of the "urban renewal" clearance 
type or the revitalization that has prompted gentrifica-
tion184-have thus become matters of intense public concern. 1811 
Such problems point toward the need for "maximum feasible 
participation" of all groups in the community in any newly initi-
ated development process, and the heightening of professional 
ethics and standards regarding advocacy planning. 
182. Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 42 
U.S.C.). 
183. The 1954 amendments to the 1949 Act provided that slum prevention could be 
pursued by redeveloping deteriorating areas and conserving areas in danger of deteriora-
tion. Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, tit. III, § 311, 68 Stat. 590, 626, repealed 
by Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I,§ 116, 
88 Stat. 633, 652 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982)). 
184. 
Gentrification is a term used in land development to describe a trend whereby 
previously "underdeveloped" areas become "revitalized" as persons of relative 
affluence invest in homes and begin to "upgrade" the neighborhood economi-
cally. This process often causes the eviction of the less affluent residents who can 
no longer afford the increasingly expensive housing in their neighborhood. Gen-
trification is a deceptive term which masks the dire consequences that "upgrad-
ing" of neighborhoods causes when the neighborhood becomes too expensive for 
either rental or purchase by the less affluent residents who bear the brunt of the 
change. 
Business Ass'n v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 874 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981). 
185. Welborn, supra note 1, at 152; see, e.g., Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 
484 F.2d. 1122 (2d. Cir. 1973) (contesting racial quotas restricting the number of blacks 
and hispanics in an integrated public housing project as attempt to "gentrify" project). 
SPRING 1987] Affordable Housing 765 
1. Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds 
and the Housing Assistance Plan- The Housing and Commu-
nity Development Act of 1974186 revived the local role in the 
production of affordable housing, essentially dormant since the 
Depression. The 1974 Act vastly increased the discretion af-
forded local government in the allocation and use of federal 
funds. The Act recognized that urban government, to rest on a 
sound financial base, must balance service to the poor with out-
reach to the middle class, and struck a compromise:187 localities 
were required to provide for the housing needs of low and mod-
erate income people as a condition of receiving CDBG program 
funds. 188 The compromise was framed in Title I of the Act. Title 
I required local government recipients of CDBG funds to pre-
pare a housing assistance plan (HAP).189 Pursuant to the HAP, 
the locality must project housing need for eligible low and mod-
erate income families residing in or expected to reside in the 
community. The HAP is perhaps the clearest statutory connec-
tion between housing opportunities for the poor and overall 
community development objectives.190 In the absence of fair 
housing or other objectives, 191 the local government's view of 
housing development as expressed in the HAP is authoritative, 
186. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 42 
U.S.C.). 
187. Decent housing for the poor was linked to community development and eco-
nomic opportunity, so as to create an attractive environment for the return of the middle 
class. Welborn, supra note 1, at 155. 
188. The Community Development Block Grant Program consolidated all federal 
programs such as urban renewal, model cities, and the like, and increased the power of 
localities to employ federal funds for community redevelopment. The categorical grant 
programs that CDBG replaced entailed a much greater degree of federal intervention 
and control. Model cities, urban renewal, and other such categorical grant programs were 
administered directly by the local office of HUD, not local government officials. For a 
discussion of community development block grants, see Williamson, Community Devel-
opment Block Grants, 14 URB. LAW. 283 (1982). 
189. By requiring local governments to study and honor their housing assistance 
needs, the HAP requirement of the 1974 Housing Act instituted a limitation on local 
autonomy. Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
557, § 103(d), 92 Stat. 2080, 2083 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (1982 & 
Supp. III 1985)). As such, the HAP became a bone of contention among local govern-
ment, the federal government, and fair housing advocates, as difficult issues of housing 
need identification and resource allocation were confronted in the context of overall com-
munity development. See, e.g., NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 668 F. Supp. 762 
(E.D.N.Y 1987). · 
190. Welborn, supra note 1, at 156. 
191. HUD regulations require spatial deconcentration of the poor. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. 
§ 881.206(c) (1981). For a discussion of HUD spatial deconcentration policy and its con-
nection with gentrification, see Note, Gentrification, Tipping and the National Housing 
Policy, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1982-1983). 
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and HUD must respect it when granting or denying requests for 
subsidies from private sponsors of low income housing.192 
2. Housing Development Action Grants- The Housing De-
velopment Action Grant (HODAG) program, which originated in 
1983, transfers capital from federal to state and local govern-
ment for new construction and rehabilitation of multifamily 
rental housing.198 The grant is modeled after the highly success-
ful Urban Development Action Grant. Recent legislation would 
reauthorize HODAG at nearly $100 million to build or substan-
tially rehabilitate 5000 dwelling units. 194 States receiving 
HODAG funds could determine their use-for shallow or deep 
subsidies; for public housing; for private, assisted housing; for 
the needs of the homeless; and so forth. 1911 Funds could be used 
by local governments to rehabilitate properties foreclosed for tax 
arrearages or could be paid directly to neighborhood-based, non-
profit developers.196 
3. State use of mortgage revenue bonds- State and local 
governments in the 1970's used mortgage revenue bonds to pro-
vide below market interest rate home mortgages primarily to 
young, first time home buyers. States used tax-exempt bonds to 
fill the gap left when President Nixon withdrew the federal gov-
ernment from the field of subsidized housing in 1973.197 Since 
that time, many more states have begun to use mortgage reve-
nue bonds, especially for the development of multifamily hous-
ing.198 Authority to issue such bonds as tax-exempt capital-rais-
192. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 213, 
88 Stat. 633, 674 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1439 (1982)). Entitlement cities and small cities 
are no longer required to formulate HAP's at the present time. Youmans Interview, 
supra note 91. 
193. Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. III, 
§ 301, 97 Stat. 1155, 1196 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437(d), 1437o(a)(i)(B) (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985) and at 24 C.F.R. 850 (1987)). "Rental rehabilitation" grants are also authorized 
by 42 U.S.C. § 14370 (Supp. III 1985). 
194. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 provides $150 million 
for housing development action grants in fiscal year 1988. A program entailing further 
deregulation, the Housing Development Block Grant, is now contemplated by the admin-
istration. Local government recipients would be subject only to outstanding law regard-
ing fair housing, environmental protection, and the like. Block grants could not support 
new construction without being leveraged by debt financing, however. See Milgram, 
Housing, supra note 73, at 133. 
195. 50th Anniversary, supra note 132, at 10. 
196. H.R. REP. No. 122, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1987) [hereinafter H.R. 4 REP.]. 
197. See Fernsler, Tax-Exempt Financing for Housing-HUD and Local Govern-
ments in Joint Venture with Public and Private Owners and Lenders, 11 URB. LAW. 429 
(1979) (discussion of state use of tax-exempt financing). 
198. Id.; see also NAHB, supra note 1, at 36. The attractiveness of these bonds as 
sources of development capital increased dramatically in the context of the rising mort-
gage rates in the late 1970's. 
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ing vehicles has so far been permitted by Congress for short 
periods only, with a sunset provision ending the option after a 
few years.199 
4. Linkage and the "builder's remedy" harnessing the local 
development process- Linkage programs are based on the as-
sumption that upper-status employees of major businesses asso-
ciated with downtown redevelopment may bid up the price of 
inner city housing, causing gentrification or, if they live in the 
suburbs, impose unacceptable burdens on highways, mass 
transit, and commuter railroad facilities. Linkage thus requires 
businesses to share in some of the costs that their development 
imposes on the urban social and physical environment, either 
through cash payments or by incorporating low and moderate 
income housing units as part of commercial development. 200 San 
Francisco, the first American city to adopt such a plan, limits 
office production via floor area ratios and height maxima and 
assesses developers for housing, transit, park space, child care, 
and various other community amenities.201 Linkage techniques 
have also been used, with mixed results, in Santa Monica202 and 
Boston.203 A linkage program is also on the drawing board in 
Washington, D.C.20• 
Linkage is an important and innovative tool for harnessing 
and regulating the effects of large scale development on the 
transportation, employment, and housing systems of urban ar-
eas. The analogue in the suburban context is called the 
"builder's remedy" in New Jersey, or the "mandatory set-aside" 
in other jurisdictions.2011 It has generally worked better in the 
199. At present, sunset legislation terminates mortgage revenue bonds in 1989. 26 
U.S.C.A. § 143(a)(I)(B) (West 1987). 
200. The basic analogy is to subdivision exactions. See McDougall, The Revitalizing 
City, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 667, 686 & n.149 (1984). 
201. The plan is administered by the San Francisco Office of Housing Production 
Programs in the Department of City Planning. Lewis, San Francisco's Bold Attempt to 
Regulate Growth, Wash. Post, June 13, 1987, at El, col. 6. 
202. In Santa Monica, developers are required to contribute up to 12% of project 
replacement costs for affordable housing, transit, employment, and community amenities 
such as day care. Keating, Linking Downtown Development to Broader Community 
Goals, AM. PLAN. A.J., Spring 1986, at 133, 136. 
203. Boston's program was initiated in 1983, modeled after San Francisco's ordi-
nance. The program is implemented by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. Fees 
based on a project's square footage are paid monthly to a housing trust fund for develop-
ment of affordable housing elsewhere; alternatively, the developer may provide the requi-
site affordable units in lieu of paying his fees. Id. at 136-37. 
204. Precious, D.C. Seeks to Raise Hadid 'Linkage' Fee, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1987, 
at El, col. 6. 
205. See McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation for Exclu-
sionary Zoning, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 665, 677 (1987). 
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suburbs, where the nexus between the need for low and moder-
ate income housing and the development of market rate housing 
is clearer and developers are more eager to build, regardless of 
conditions. 206 
Linkage has been challenged by developers, who assert the ab-
sence of a nexus sufficient to support regulation between their 
businesses and the gentrification difficulties projected. In addi-
tion, linkage is challenged as ultra vires the standard zoning ena-
bling act, 207 and as an unconstitutional taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation. The latter view has been given 
considerable force by the recent Supreme Court decision in Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Commission, 208 holding that govern-
ment regulation of beachfront property was excessive and 
amounted to an impermissible taking.209 Justice Scalia, for the 
majority, stressed the need for a closer examination of the con-
nection between expressed public purposes for land use regula-
tion and the means of achieving the articulated goal. 210 Thus, 
the municipality must prove both a legitimate purpose and an 
acceptable means for achieving it.211 Many linkage programs 
would not pass muster under this test. 
B. The Role of Citizen-Initiated Community Development 
The role of voluntary organizations in the formulation of 
housing policy reached a height in 1911, when the National 
Housing Association (NHA) was formed. 212 The NHA faded 
from importance during the Depression, however, as the federal 
government adopted many of the programs it advocated.213 To-
day, modern community organizations can look upon the years 
since that time and call upon a rich history of struggle for civil 
rights and for community empowerment in the context of fed-
206. See Southern Burlington County, NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). But see Fairfax County v. DeGroff, 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 
(1973). 
207. The Washington State Supreme Court struck down Seattle's linkage program as 
unconstitutional on these grounds. See Keating, supra note 202, at 141 (citing Hillis 
Homes v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982)); Note, Subdivision 
Exactions in Washington: The Controversy Over Imposing Fees On Developers, 59 
WASH. L. REV. 289 (1984). 
208. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
209. Id. at 3150. 
210. Id. at 3148. 
211. Id. 
212. R. Shiffman, supra note 37, at 18. 
213. Id. 
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eral antipoverty214 and model cities programs,2111 as well as bat-
tles against urban renewal,216 housing segregation, and environ-
mental pollution. These organizations, having survived program 
cutbacks and political repression during the Nixon administra-
tion, emerged sophisticated and energetic. 
1. Community development organizations- The pre-Nixon 
generation of community development corporations was exem-
plified by such major organizations as the Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Restoration Corporation (BSRC).217 The BSRC placed commu-
nity activists in collaboration with professionals familiar with 
the complex maze of federal and private financing techniques.218 
In association with organizations of this stature, voluntary com-
munity organizations such as churches, block clubs, and settle-
ment houses began to experiment with nonprofit sponsorship of 
low and moderate income housing. 
When austerity emerged as national policy in the late 1970's, 
the high level of technical and political capability that commu-
nity organizations had developed was very useful in their efforts 
at self help. On shoestring budgets, neighborhood organizations 
embarked on projects providing all manner of community ser-
vices-health care, housing, child care, surplus food, small parks, 
and community cleanup. 219 Some projects succeeded; others 
failed. Community organizations also battled with downtown in-
214. The antipoverty program attempted to foster maximum feasible participation of 
the poor. The model, developed during the Kennedy administration, bypassed local gov-
ernment, where Kennedy was not strong, and went directly to the inner city communi-
ties where he was strong. R. Shiffman, supra note 37, at 11. Inevitably, confrontations 
between local citizen groups and local politicians resulted. These confrontations (and 
some scandals) facilitated the redirecting of housing resources; conceptions of how the 
funds should be used (from "employment" to "service") reflected the new reality. Presi-
dent Johnson's modification in 1966-the Model Cities program ("demonstration cit-
ies")-funded citizen groups with federal dollars that were channeled through local gov-
ernments. Id. Johnson, unlike Kennedy, was connected with regular party leadership and 
big city mayors. Id. 
215. The goal of the model cities program was to coordinate development under the 
wide variety of categorical grants available at the time-jobs, health, housing, and urban 
redevelopment. NAHB, supra note 1, at 34. 
216. Before the struggles against urban renewal, the poor had been wards of political 
machines or supplicants for private charity, relinquishing control over their own Jives in 
exchange for aid. Some tenement movements antedate this period, however. R. Shiffman, 
supra note 37, at 300. 
217. Sviridoff, Urban Neighborhoods-Past, Present and Future, YOUTH PoL'Y, Sept. 
1987, at 3, 5-6. The new approach envisioned active community participation in the 
planning, sponsorship, development, employment, and construction phases of develop-
ment projects. R. Shiffman, supra note 37, at 23. 
218. Sviridoff, supra note 217, at 5-6. 
219. Telephone conversation with Alice Shabekoff, Director of the Community Infor-
mation Exchange, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 11, 1987) [hereinafter Shabekoff Interview]. 
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terests over highways, pollution, and gentrification. Some orga-
nizations won; others lost. The most adaptable of these organiza-
tions survived and continued their work despite the lack of 
federal support. 220 
These "second generation" community development organiza-
tions are smaller, leaner, more indigenous, and more in tune 
with the specific agenda of their local communities than their 
predecessors, which were more closely tied to downtown and the 
corporate sector. Weaned from the need for large federal subsi-
dies,221 able to depend to a large extent on volunteers,222 these 
organizations are free to protect their communities in ways 
never possible under the antipoverty program, the Model Cities, 
or the Community Development Corporation (CDC) statutes. In 
this respect, second generation community development organi-
zations resemble the early self help groups of the late nineteenth 
century, which were knit together by ethnicity or religious belief. 
Many are surprisingly sophisticated in their technical knowledge 
of housing and community development, from financing to envi-
ronmental issues.223 The work of these second generation com-
munity development corporations has been aided by, among 
others, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) of the 
Ford Foundation and James Rouse's Enterprise Foundation.224 
220. R. Shiffman, supra note 37, at 22; Svirodoff, supra note 217, at 7 (noting that 
diminution of federal role has pressed the private sector and state and local governments 
into service with spotty but promising results). 
221. Fee for service contracts from local municipalities provide some measure of sup-
port, though this is hardly a "subsidy." R. Shiffman, supra note 37, at 28. 
222. The Comprehensive Employment Training Act bridged the distance between 
complete federal subsidy and the volunteer model. See id. 
223. Shabekoff Interview, supra note 219; see also Mott, The Neighborhood Move-
ment at a Crossroads, YOUTH PoL'v, Dec. 1986, at 3, 5. Community organizations demon-
strate an increased sophistication and willingness to deal with city hall (necessary for 
development permits, CDBG funds, tax-foreclosed properties, and the like), and a 
heightened ability to tap banks and corporations for small loans for the residential and 
commercial revitalization of their neighborhoods. 
224. Rouse's well-known entrepreneurial efforts include Baltimore's Inner Harbor, 
Boston's Faneuil Hall, and New York's South Street Seaport. See Guenther, Real Es-
tate, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1986, at 23, col. 1. Rouse has also been involved with Washing-
ton, D.C.'s Jubilee Housing (a community-based nonprofit housing developer). See, e.g., 
NAHB II, supra note 71, at 87: 
Founded in 1982 by James Rouse, The Enterprise Foundation provides funding 
and technical assistance to local nonprofit housing corporations for rehabilitat-
ing or constructing housing for households with incomes of $10,000 or less. It is 
currently working with 49 groups in 23 cities to help the local groups formulate 
city-wide solutions to housing problems. In doing so, it seeks models of housing 
finance and community development that can be replicated elsewhere. 
See also Cohen, Captain Enterprise, BALTIMORE MAG., Apr. 1987, at 78 (chronicling 
James Rouse's entry into low income housing development after retiring from large-scale 
commercial development). 
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On the national level, such organizations have also united to 
lobby the federal government for accountability in housing and 
community development.2211 
2. The community reinvestment movement- Second gener-
ation CDC's have had considerable success in shaking loose 
funds and technical assistance from local financial institutions, 
especially with the assistance of the Community Reinvestment 
Act of 1977 (CRA).226 Use of the CRA requires a good deal of 
financial sophistication, a sophistication that a number of these 
organizations have also developed over time. · 
The CRA requires banks to meet all service needs extant in 
the community in which they function. For example, if savings 
deposits are accepted, mortgages must be accepted as well. 
Banks are prohibited by law from defining community service 
areas in such a way as to exclude minority or low income neigh-
borhoods. Banks and other financial institutions can lose impor-
tant privileges if they disobey the law, and periodic review of 
institutional activity provides a time and a place at which com-
munity advocates can exert pressure to see that the law is ob-
served. 227 This review and enforcement process considers com-
plaints made by citizens who feel that they have been disserved 
by illegal bank practices. Complaints are also heard whenever 
banks apply for exercise of various privileges under the banking 
laws. To anticipate community objections, many banks have be-
The Local Initiatives Support Corporation was founded in 1980. LISC's "goal is to 
draw private sector financial and technical resources into the development of deterio-
rated communities. LISC works through a network of Area Advisory Committees that 
help to select projects for investment and to raise additional funds for local projects." 
NAHB II, supra note 71, at 87-88. 
225. Kromkowski, Neighborhood Activism: Remembering Geno Baroni, YOUTH PoL'Y, 
Dec. 1986, at 7. 
226. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1982)). 
227. Federally chartered S & L's must make public the sites where they lend for 
home purchase and improvement. 12 U.S.C. § 2801-2811 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The 
statute's effectiveness has been reduced, however, as S & L's leave the housing mortgage 
business and their place is taken by mortgage banking corporations that do not require 
capital transfers from the federal government -and hence are not covered under the stat-
ute. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 expands coverage to include 
such institutions. Blakely, House Panel OKs $17.7 Billion Housing Plan, 45 CoNG. Q. 
WEEKLY REP. 843, 843 (1987). Amendments to the bill when it was in conference pro-
vided for a permanent extension of HMDA coverage of private mortgage companies that 
were affiliates of bank and S & L holding companies (about 2000 institutions), lowering 
of the company income threshold at which an institution was required to report under 
HMDA, and the inclusion of commercial lending practices within the purview of the Act. 
Id. at 844. 
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gun to develop affirmatively community reinvestment projects in 
conjunction with local community development organizations.228 
Although federal enforcement of the CRA has been lax under 
the Reagan administration, hopeful signs of state-level innova-
tions in the CRA arena are beginning to surface. State CRA's 
might flourish regardless of the tenor of national housing policy. 
State CRA's have been passed to structure state government ne-
gotiations with out-of-state banks seeking entry into their juris-
dictions. Massachusetts has its own state CRA, for example.229 
Local governments are able to use the CRA inventory of tools to 
monitor lending, challenge financial institutions, and develop re-
investment programs, and they can condition local subsidies to 
businesses and financial institutions upon performance and com-
munity reinvestment. They have not moved aggressively in this 
area, however, perhaps out of fear that financial institutions will 
leave the vicinity. 230 
In summary, the federal government is withdrawing from sub-
sidizing housing for all citizens, regardless of income, and di-
recting capital expenditures to "competitive" industry instead. 
As the federal government recedes from the picture, the focus of 
housing policy has shifted to state and local government and to 
the efforts of private, nonprofit community organizations and 
corporations. As the Reagan administration comes to a close, 
certain limited options may reemerge at the national level, 
however. 
IV. TOWARDS A NEW NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY 
Generally speaking, the problem of affordable housing for the 
1990's is what it has been since the 1930's-the gap between 
people's incomes and the cost of housing. Because the economic 
228. The community reinvestment plans thus generated amount to over $3 billion 
worth of development. C. Bradford, Neighborhood Reinvestment: The Legacy and the 
Challenge 17 (Nov. 25, 1985) (unpublished paper) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
Such figures account for actual reinvestment and do not include reverses in capital flow 
due to changes in everyday bank practices. Id. Such lending also increasingly covers 
commercial and economic development as well as residential development. Id. at 18. In 
Chicago, three banks loaned $55 million for commercial and business development. Id. 
In addition to banks, companies such as Aetna and Allstate have gotten involved, fi-
nancing the development of housing, commercial properties, and light industry. Id. at 19. 
Amoco and Sohio organized programs in the wake of concern over abusive practices in 
pricing home heating fuel. Id. 
229. Id. at 21. 
230. Id. at 22. 
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class structure of our society is not likely to be dramatically re-
worked, it is doubtful that we will see an increase in the size of 
the group capable of renting or buying decent, safe housing 
without benefit of subsidy. By the same token, because the hous-
ing industry is unlikely to be dramatically restructured through 
use of modular and prefabricated housing, the price of con-
structing and rehabilitating housing will probably not decrease. 
The housing finance industry is unlikely to prove capable of pro-
viding construction and mortgage loans at significantly lower in-
terest rates without regulation or subsidy or both. Local govern-
ments are unlikely to give up growth controls without a fight, 
though the Supreme Court's recent landmark decision in First 
Evangelical Lutheran Church u. Los Angeles County231 may 
make such growth controls less stringent. 
In a time of national austerity and a correlative indifference to 
the problems of minorities and the poor, only modest undertak-
ings can be contemplated. Which of the varying social problems 
of low, moderate, and middle income persons that are related to 
the lack of affordable housing have the highest priority? Which 
should be sacrificed if their inclusion in a policy package for af-
fordable housing pushes the total cost too high?232 With respect 
to the issue of affordable housing considered in isolation, how 
far can subsidies be stretched? How many households should be 
served, at what income levels, and at what level of expenditure 
for each?233 
Whatever the answers to these questions may be, it is clear 
that a substantial infusion of funds would be necessary to signif-
icantly increase the availability of affordable housing, a particu-
larly difficult endeavor, politically and economically, in an era of 
extraordinary structural budget deficits. The first order of busi-
ness is not to increase the availability of such housing, but to 
preserve the affordable housing that presently exists. This prior-
ity has been made more difficult by the policy of the Reagan 
administration to use housing as the principal target for domes-
tic spending cuts. 
The next order of business is to begin a process of experimen-
tation, backed with sufficient funding, to develop a range of 
housing alternatives wide enough to suit the variety of markets 
and communities where affordable housing is needed. Such al-
231. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (holding ordinance prohibiting construction in a flood 
plain area a constitutionally impermissible "taking"). 
232. Milgram, supra note 3, at 111-13. 
233. Id. 
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ternatives would present different mixtures of participation by 
federal, state, and local governments, combined with participa-
tion by civic and community organizations. Once such models 
have been developed, the funds necessary to support them must 
be provided by reducing expenditures on other federal budget 
items or by raising new federal revenues, or perhaps both. The 
following is an overview of pending legislation, a presentation of 
some models available for addressing the problem at the state 
and local level, and a discussion of possible funding mechanisms 
at the federal level. 
A. New Legislation 
Two recently passed pieces of legislation address the housing 
problem. 234 The first focuses on the crisis in the S & L industry. 
The second directly tackles some significant housing problems. 
1. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 198'11-35- The 
FSLIC has been taxed severely by the increase in S & L failures 
caused by disintermediation and deregulation. A very important 
federal legislative initiative regarding home ownership has there-
fore been the recapitalization of the FSLIC through the Com-
petitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. The new law authorizes 
$3.75 billion in new borrowing authority per year to refinance 
the FSLIC.236 In the FSLIC's fifty-three year history, public 
funds have never been used to guarantee S & L 
234. In addition to the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 and the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1987, the President has also signed into law the 
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987), 
authorizing one billion dollars for programs aiding the homeless. 
235. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. & 31 U.S.C.). 
236. Id. § 302, 101 Stat. at 590 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1436). The money will 
be raised by means of a complex borrowing arrangement, whereby the twelve regional 
federal home loan banks provide three billion dollars to a new Financing Corporation, 
which will in turn use these funds to purchase $2.2 billion in zero-coupon treasury bonds 
with thirty-year payouts, (similar to savings bonds, with interest deferred until maturity) 
and also issue $10 billion in bonds for sale to private investors. Id. § 302, 101 Stat. at 
587. The bond debt will be serviced by member S & L's through deposit levies assessed 
by the FHLBB and by about $800 million in payouts from the treasury bonds. This 
recapitalization plan was adopted as an alternative to a proposed savings and loan indus-
try plan involving thinner capitalization of the FSLIC and lower assessments on FHLBB 
member banks. The conference committee considered this plan inadequate because in-
sufficient funds were provided to improve the FSLIC's condition. Blakely, Bailout of 
S & L Insurance Fund Approved by Senate Banking, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 473 
(1987). The new law is also an alternative to a proposed FHLBB plan to borrow $750 
million from the United States Treasury to help deal with insolvent S & L's and to pay 
off depositors. See id. at 473. 
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deposits. 237 
The FSLIC bailout was considered particularly necessary be-
cause of the economic recession in western farm and oil states 
that reduced the value of real estate underlying regional S ~ L's 
mortgage portfolios.238 The FSLIC currently uses yearly assess-
ments on member S & L's deposits to insure the $890 billion 
worth of deposits in all three thousand S & L's. Its reserves are 
now only $1.9 billion-$23 billion below the amount needed to 
close the more than 300 insolvent S & L's across the country.239 
Because the FSLIC does not have the money to shut these 
S & L's down and pay off their depositors, the S & L's remain in 
operation-taking the system six million dollars in the red each 
day.2•0 
The Act originally authorized the spending of five billion dol-
lars over two years, but the price tag was increased in response 
to the worsening condition of the S & L's.m In response to pres-
sure from industry representatives who argued that S & L's 
damaged by local recessions will recover in time, 242 however, the 
law also limits the ability of the FHLBB to close down failing 
S & L's in states such as Texas, in which regional recessions are 
in progress. 243 The FSLIC will also be given greater discretion to 
refuse to classify S & L's as "troubled" or to restructure bad 
loans. 244 Moreover, an appeals procedure will be established for 
thrifts that dispute FSLIC appraisals of their assets. These vari-
ous limitations on FHLBB power will reduce short-term outlays 
(as the fund must be drawn upon to finance the closing of an 
S & L and the bailing out of its depositors), but long-term costs 
could increase (as S & L's that fail in the future will have be-
come that much more damaged in the interim).2411 On the other 
237. Blakely, supra note 236, at 473. 
238. Blakely, Fight Brews Over Bailing Out Ailing Savings Insurance Fund, 45 
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 151 (1987). 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Blakely, Wright Reverses His Position, Backs Bigger S & L Rescue Plan, 45 
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 842, 842 (1987). 
242. Blakely, Proxmire Offers Comprehensive Banking Bill, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 
REP. 331 (1987). 
243. Blakely, supra note 236, at 474. 
244. Id. 
245. The effect of the new law remains to be seen. If interest rates continue to rise, 
disintermediation and consequent S & L failure will increase. The United States, because 
of low productivity and savings rates has become both a debtor and a net importer na-
tion. Foreign investment is thus needed to finance both our trade deficit and our federal 
budget deficit, and if the Federal Reserve keeps interest rates low by loosening monetary 
policy, this financing source will diminish. Id. 
776 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:3 
hand, healthy S & L's that desire to leave the FHLBB system 
must wait a year to do so. 246 This may restrain the larger S & L's 
from leaving the system to escape increased FSLIC fees. 247 
2. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1987-
Congress recently passed a major housing bill- the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1987. · Unlike housing bills 
cleared by the House in the past, the Act cleared the Senate due 
to the new Democratic majority. 248 In today's budget-cutting at-
mosphere, the passage of a housing bill that did no more than 
retain existing funding levels would be a major achievement. 
Voting patterns made it unlikely that Congress could have over-
riden a veto of a stronger bill. 249 
The Act warrants examination as it addresses a number of im-
portant issues that will no doubt be addressed again in 1989 if 
political administrations change.uo The most important of these 
issues include: preventing the displacement of low income ten-
Higher interest rates, on the other hand, reduce housing starts. Housing construction 
fell for the third consecutive month in May 1987, following interest rate increases in 
April stemming from attempts by the Fed to stop the decline of the dollar on the inter-
national market. Forecasts for housing starts for 1987 thus had to be revised down to 1.6 
million new units, a decline of 200,000 units compared to the 1.8 million units built in 
1986. Id. 
Foreigners worry that a drop in the value of the dollar relative to their own currencies 
will cause them to lose money. In April 1987, the Fed responded to such fears· by increas-
ing interest rates, thereby making investments in the United States more attractive. 
Berry, Appointment Draws Praise, Wash. Post, June 3, 1987, at Al, col. 5, AS, col. 2. 
Higher interest rates provide a cushion against losses due to a dollar devaluation. It will 
be very difficult for the Fed to reduce interest rates without "knocking the props out 
from under the dollar," however, and causing our currency to engage in "free fall" on the 
international market. Crutsinger, Housing Starts Fall Again in March, Wash. Post, June 
17, 1987, at F3, col. 1. 
246. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 306(h), 101 
Stat. 552, 602 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730). Healthy S & L's may qualify as com-
mercial banks eligible to join the FDIC-a healthy, $18 billion insurance fund that 
charges much lower premiums than the FSLIC. Blakely, supra note 238, at 152. 
247. The Competitive Equality Banking Act provides a "grandfather clause" by 
which S & L's leaving the system before March 31, 1987 do not pay exit fees. H.R. CONF. 
REP. No. 261, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 157-58, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CooE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 588, 626-27. 
248. 133 CONG. REC. H12,095 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (recording the vote in the 
House on the bill passed in the Senate). 
249. Congress watered the bill down significantly to avoid a presidential veto. For 
example, the Nehemiah grant program is now a two year demonstration project and 
housing development provisions contain "sunset" clauses that cause them to expire in 
two years. See Housing Bill Approval Highlights 1987, HOUSING AFF. LETIER, Jan. 1, 
1988, at 1, 2. 
250. See, e.g., Mariano, Cranston Pushes New Housing Legislation, Wash. Post, 
June 27, 1987, at El, col. 1, E2, col. 3. 
SPRING 1987) Affordable Housing 777 
ants from existing subsidized projects,2111 Community Develop-
ment Block Grants (CDBG),2112 and public housing.2113 
The Act requires that mortgagors under HUD-subsidized pro-
grams such as section 221(d)(3) and section 236 notify HUD and 
the tenants at least one year before prepaying the mortgages and 
freeing themselves from income ceilings for project residents. 2114 
It also creates a new direct loan program to prevent default in 
less successful section 221(d)(3) and section 236 housing 
projects. It also provides for nearly 40,000 section 8 subsidized 
housing certificates. 
Under the Act, seventy-five percent of CDBG funds are to be 
used for the benefit of low and moderate income persons. No 
CDBG funds are to be used for projects that displace low and 
moderate income persons; citizens must be permitted to partici-
pate in all phases of a project, at all levels, and plans would be 
required from localities to ensure such participation. The fund-
ing level of the CDBG program is scheduled by the Act to con-
tinue at three billion dollars.21111 Finally, the law requires that any 
economic development initiatives undertaken with CDBG funds 
must consider the needs of low and moderate income persons, 
and must not be used for displacement.2116 
The Act provides $1.5 billion for operating subsidies to public 
housing projects. It will also build 5000 units of public housing 
and provide five million dollars for child care in public housing 
projects.2117 New construction will be permitted to replace demol-
ished units, but HUD will have discretion to substitute section 8 
existing housing certificates for demolished units as well. In the 
House committee's view, public housing has become more im-
portant as privately constructed assisted housing has come to 
seem less viable. 2118 · 
251. S. 825, §§ 221-235, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H12,047, H12,066-68 
(daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987). 
252. Id. §§ 502, 509, 510, 133 CONG. REc. at H12,081. 
253. Id. §§ 122, 123, 133 CONG. REc. at H12,054-57. 
254. The Housing Community Development Act of 1987 requires that the adminis-
tration sell subsidized properties with restrictions that keep rents low. Id. § 181(F)(2), 
133 CONG. REc. at Hl2,064. 
255. Id. § 501(a), 133 CONG. REC. at H12,079. 
256. Id. § 502(b), 133 CONG. REC. at H12,080. 
257. Id. § 118, 133 CONG. REC. at H12,051. 
258. Dorius Interview, supra note 133. 
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B. Towards-an Omnibus Housing Act of 1989 
The legislation will stem the worst of the decline in federal 
involvement in housing, but will still fall short of what is neces-
sary to stabilize the market for affordable housing. Thoroughgo-
ing reform and a restructuring of federal housing policy effort is 
needed, not only to repair the damage done during the last 
seven years but also to orient national housing policy to modern 
realities. These realities include a structural budget deficit, 
caused by our unwillingness to cut both domestic and defense 
spending or increase taxes, either of which is necessary to tame 
the deficit; imbalances in our international trade and financial 
positions, including a decline in "competitiveness"; and shifting 
demographics in our population. 
The Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, 
now under Democratic control, is a prime location for new fed-
eral initiatives in affordable housing. Under the leadership of 
Senator Alan Cranston, the committee has scheduled hearings to 
be held in February 1988, in preparation for major housing legis-
lation. 2159 At present, the committee is taking scrupulous care to 
avoid giving the impression that they favor a particular ap-
proach, as they wish to create a bill that will achieve the 
broadest possible consensus on housing direction for the nation. 
This approach will ensure the development of a bill that is likely 
to pass. It will also create a housing consensus that should assist 
the Democratic party in the 1988 national elections, and create a 
network of housing thinkers and doers set to implement 
whatever recommendations are finally accepted. Thus, the result 
of the 1973 Nixon moratorium on new housing production-the 
shattering of a preexisting bipartisan coalition for housing-may 
finally be reversed. 260 
259. The ensuing description of the housing initiatives being undertaken by Senator 
Cranston's committee is based on a telephone interview with Donald Campbell, Senator 
Cranston's Chief of Staff for Housing Issues, Washington, D.C. (July 30, 1987). 
260. Telephone interview with Professor Langley Keyes, Department of Urban Plan-
ning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (July 30, 1987) [hereinafter Keyes Inter-
view]. The Committee has issued invitations to organizations and institutions in the 
fields of both market rate and assisted housing to submit comments for a committee 
print that will be issued in September. These comments will in turn supplement a series 
of twenty papers to be delivered by various experts in a series of conferences to be held 
in October 1987 in Washington, D.C. The conference is being arranged by the Depart-
ment of Urban Planning of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and is 
being funded by the Ford Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and the 
FNMA Foundation. In the meantime, James Rouse of the Enterprise Foundation and 
David Maxwell of FNMA are pulling together a network of housing developers, munici-
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The committee is looking for a bill that will articulate a clear 
set of themes of manageable proportions. Clearly, the proposals 
coming out of the committee will not accept the severely re-
duced funding levels for housing established by the Reagan ad-
ministration as their base line, and will go beyond vouchers and 
tinkering with the FNMA.281 By the same token, the themes of 
the new legislation will be clearly distinguished from the initia-
tives associated with past Democratic administrations. It is un-
likely that we will again see a program at the scale of section 236 
or section 8 new construction without a significant tax increase. 
Further, the states will be encouraged to maintain the expanded 
role that they have undertaken during the Reagan years, even 
though the federal government's role in housing policy will in-
crease relative to its role under the present administration. 
C. Some Models for Affordable Housing Development 
There are a variety of models for the development of afforda-
ble housing. Most require that both the supply of housing and 
the demand for it be subsidized to close the gap between income 
and affordability. A full discussion of any specific model is be-
yond the scope of this Article, but three models will be summa-
rized below.282 The first two depend upon public or community 
pal officials, and low income housing advocates to prepare recommendations based on 
the MIT papers. These recommendations will focus on both market rate housing af-
fordability and the provision of low and moderate income housing, and will be presented 
to the Committee in December. Id. 
261. Id. Senator Cranston favors legislation that will 
expand homeownership, particularly for first-time and low-income buyers, and 
"provide a stable environment for private investors, financial institutions" and 
others in the housing industry ... [New legislation] must also help low income 
Americans "afford decent housing" by preserving existing apartment buildings 
and providing "construction incentives" for development of housing for groups 
who need it most, such as the handicapped, elderly, and large families. 
Mariano, supra note 250, at E2, col. 1. 
262. For a general discussion of housing for the homeless, see Tuttle, Jacobs & Stipp, 
supra note 169. See also Homeless Symposium, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 137 
(1987). 
The prime obstacle to the development of these models would be local building codes 
and growth controls. Some companies might be interested in joint ventures with Japa-
nese housing companies that have pioneered in this area, much as American automakers 
have joint ventures with Japanese industrialists. According to Ed Quinn of the Enter-
prise Foundation, the products of the Cardinal Company of Baltimore, Md., are "state of 
the art" in manufactured housing, and Cardinal is comparable to Japanese companies in 
capability. Telephone interview with Ed Quinn, Enterprise Foundation (Aug. 3, 1987); 
see Peirce, Filling the Vacuum in Housing Policy, Wash. Post, June 20, 1987, at FU, 
col. 2 (summarizing the position of James Rouse, who suggests that construction costs 
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initiatives. The third depends more directly upon the private 
sector. 
1. Community development or local public housing?- The 
first model is the community development, "sweat-equity proj-
ect," in which the cost of housing is reduced by nonunion labor, 
less expensive materials, and the use of housing stock that has 
been reclaimed at low cost from properties foreclosed for failure 
to pay local property taxes or federally subsidized mortgages, or 
simply abandoned. 283 Such projects have in the past been under-
taken under the aegis of the Community Development Corpora-
tion Act28' or the Urban Homesteading Program.2811 They are 
also envisioned to be part of programs such as the Nehemiah 
Housing Grant. 288 
can be cut "as much as forty percent" by eliminating architects and independent con-
tractors, conserving usable fixtures in rehabilitation, and utilizing prefabricated and 
builders' salvaged materials. But see Lewis, The Challenge of Designing Housing For 
Low- and Middle-Income Families, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1987, at E7, col. 1 (challenging 
Rouse's proposals for diminishing housing quality). See also supra note 160 (discussion 
of tenant management and ownership of public housing). 
263. According to the National Association of Home Builders, these public-private 
projects have succeeded where many 1970's federal projects failed: 
One common feature is a high degree of tenant involvement, through sweat eq-
uity, use of community-based tradesmen, orientation programs, and designs that 
promote socialization and community involvement. Another feature . . . is a de-
parture from the middle-class standards that were characteristic of the relatively 
expensive Section 8 construction in favor of the minimal amenities viewed as 
necessary by low-income households. 
NAHB II, supra note 71, at 86. 
26_4. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 
508, 534, repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. 
VI, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 357, 519 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9912a (1982)). 
265. 12 U.S.C. § l 706e (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
266. The distinctive feature of the Nehemiah Project is its large scale-involving 
thousands of mass-produced homes, using cost-saving building design, construction, and 
materials, on a large parcel of land available at little or no cost from the municipal gov-
ernment. See NAHB II. supra note 71, at 94. The Housing Community Development Act 
of 1987 proposes to duplicate the Nehemiah experiment on a somewhat smaller scale so 
that the program is suitable for small as well as large cities. The essential concept of a 
project large enough to achieve significant economies of scale and "turn a neighborhood 
around" remains, however. See H.R. 4 REP., supra note 196, at 95-98; see also S. 825, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. Hl2,047, Hl2,088-89 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) 
(discussing tit. VI, §§ 601-613 of the Act). 
Some other examples of community-based projects include: (1) a $200 million public-
private partnership to renovate substandard housing in Chattanooga, Tennessee, under-
written by Rouse's Enterprise Foundation, Peirce, One City's Plan to Eliminate Slums, 
Wash. Post, June 13, 1987, at E4, col. 2; (2) the community-based housing supply pro-
gram of the National Low-Income Housing Coalition (a legislative proposal granting fed-
eral funds to community organizations to finance technical assistance, start-up funding, 
seed-money loans and grants, and advances for predevelopment costs), Low Income 
Hous. Information Serv., Low Income Housing Round-up, May 1987, at 2; (3) and the 
South Atlanta Land Trust (a community organization acting as a broker for mortgage 
funds to renovate a depressed inner city neighborhood, leveraging its activities with 
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Because these projects involve existing housing, growth con-
trols should not add to their cost. Interest rates for construction 
loans will be high, but construction costs can be substantially 
reduced using the methods specified. Assuming that the type of 
properties specified should be available to community organiza-
tions at little or no cost, interest rates for funds to finance the 
purchase of such properties will not be as large a factor. The 
higher the return that federal and local governments seek to 
gain by transferring such properties, however, the more the in-
terest rates for funds to finance purchases will add to the overall 
cost of such housing. 267 Even so, project purchase and construc-
tion costs can be reduced by below market interest rate funds 
available through state issuance of mortgage revenue bonds (the 
income from which is deductible for federal income tax 
purposes). 268 
The second model is public housing or assisted housing devel-
oped by state or local government, without direct federal financ-
ing or subsidy on the supply side and without federal constraints 
as to design and location. The principal contribution of the fed-
eral government in the development of such housing is to pro-
vide tax exemption for the income from mortgage revenue 
bonds. Tax-exempt status for state mortgage revenue bonds is 
essential if the states are to raise the money necessary to execute 
such projects. 269 
CDBG funds from the City of Atlanta), Low Income Hous. Information Serv., Low In-
come Housing Round-up, Dec. 1986, at 1, 5. 
For a discussion of Tax Reform Act of 1986 restrictions on the activities of charitable 
organizations that might affect the development activities of community development 
corporations, see Comment, supra note 118, at 467-93. 
267. Some states are beginning to subsidize housing more extensively rather than 
less. NAHB II, supra note 71, at 86 (describing increased state subsidies including reha-
bilitation grants and loans, tax incentives, mortgage insurance programs, and direct in-
terest rate subsidies such as the SHARP program in Massachusetts). ' 
268. According to a survey done by the National Association of Home Builders "pub-
lic-private" partnership housing projects are distinguished by a number of features in-
cluding multiple layers of subsidy from federal, state, and local governments and from 
private sources, relaxation of restrictive regulations, use of innovative building tech-
niques (thanks to relaxed building codes) and more spartan designs. Such projects can-
not be duplicated on a large scale without significant infusions of federal money. NAHB 
II, supra note 71, at 85-86. James Rouse's Enterprise Foundation, however, has packaged 
low income housing without federal subsidy that rents for $267 per month, including 
utilities, affordable to a family of four earning $10,500 per year. Cohen, supra note 224, 
at 114. 
269. Note that counties and other subdivisions of state and local governments can 
independently contract with HUD for the development of federally funded public hous-
ing. See Fernsler & Tuttle, supra note 174, at 687 (citing Newbury v. Geauga City MHA, 
732 F.2d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 1984)). For state use of tax-exempt financing, see Fernsler, 
supra note 197, at 429-34. 
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2. The mixed income private development- The third 
model is the mixed income housing development, constituted as 
a rental, cooperative,270 condominium, or land trust, in which 
middle income persons are given incentives to purchase or rent 
in proximity to low and moderate income persons for a kind of 
"mainstreaming."271 A variation on this theme is the "linkage" 
program, in which commercial, office, or market rate housing de-
velopment subsidizes low and moderate income housing through 
transfer payments or by incorporating low and moderate income 
housing units into the development project itself. 
This model is based on the assumption that federal support 
for single family home ownership must be reconsidered in light 
of the fact that the cost of owner-occupied housing drastically 
inflates the price of housing for all Americans, whether they own 
or rent. 212 
270. For a discussion of cooperatives, see Tuttle, Jacobs & Stipp, supra note 169, at 
804-09. A variation on the cooperative is the "mutual housing association." Housing 
(whether multifamily apartments, scattered-site single family houses, or rowhouses) is 
owped by the MHA and the "residents" receive a dwelling unit for life, which they can 
pass on to their children. Residents pay a one-time entrance fee of approximately $2500, 
and pay the equivalent of co-op lease and amortization charges during their tenure. The 
fees are used as equity for the MHA to develop more properties. MHA's are the 
brainchild of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NRC). Members of its Board 
of Directors include the Chairman of the FHLBB, the Secretary of HUD, and the Comp-
troller of the Currency. Interview with Beverly Hiegaard, Field Officer, Neighborhood 
Reinvestment Corporation, (Nov. 12, 1987) [hereinafter Hiegaard Interview]. NRC's 
MHA demonstration was authorized by the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399, tit. III, § 316, 94 Stat. 1614, 1645. 
271. For a discussion of undesirable tenants' "due process" rights to admission, see 
Williams, The Future of Tenants' Rights in Assisted Housing Under a Reagan Voucher 
Plan: An Analysis of Section 8 Existing Housing Cases, 23 URB. LAW. ANN. 3, 16-24 
(1982). 
272. Each dwelling unit's price includes its potential as a tax shelter, whether the 
purchaser can use it for this purpose or not. Owners can subsidize their monthly pay-
ments by means of the deduction for mortgage interest. The resulting inflated prices 
affect the entire housing market. See Waite, The Shattered Dream of American Housing 
Policy-The Need for Reform, 26 B.C.L. REV. 655, 656, 688-90 (1985). There have been 
alternatives suggested that would give persons seeking permanent housing the opportu-
nity to afford it without the astronomical cost of a traditional purchase. One such propo-
sal is the long-term lease. See Waite, The Long-Term Lease as an Alternative to Home 
Ownership: A Proposal, 15 URB. LAW. ANN. 199 (1978). 
Professor Waite suggests such a mechanism would be a positive response to the finan-
cial, use, and social factors that are involved in purchasing property. These leases would 
require some minimal level of rent stabilization that would ensure the tenant some rea-
sonable period of occupancy. The lease may also need to provide for an increase in the 
rent over time to give the landlord incentive to be a party to the lease. Id. at 202. 
Other issues would require specific attention in order to make such an agreement 
work. For example, the maintenance of the property might need to be guaranteed by 
performance bonds, insurance coverage, and rights of inspection by a designated third 
party. Id. at 203. Also, improvements made by a tenant should be provided for in the 
lease to avoid materialmen's and mechanics' liens held against the landlord. Id. at 204-
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People are willing to pay inflated prices for housing because a 
large portion of these funds-interest payments-are tax-de-
ductible. Federal tax deductions for home mortgage interest 
payments constitute the single largest federal housing subsidy. 
At an annual cost of thirty-one billion dollars, it dwarfs public 
housing, AFDC, and all assisted housing programs combined. 
This subsidy is a target for budget-cutting to finance defense 
spending273 and to obviate the need for a tax increase. 274 Rather 
than simply diverting these funds to defense spending, however, 
the funds could be used to finance a program of tenure conver-
sion that could be structured to encourage many Americans to 
pay rent to cooperatives, at a lower price than they now pay for 
owner-occupied or rental housing, while generally reducing the 
overall market price of housing. 
Tax deductions for mortgage interest on private, owner-occu-
pied homes could be phased out over a period of four years, with 
a tax-free rollover of equity in an owner-occupied home to mem-
bership in a cooperative chartered under certain regulations of 
federal, state, and local governments. The cooperative could 
qualify as a tax-free exit from home ownership if it demon-
strates adherence to the fair housing laws and provides for a cer-
tain stipulated mix of income classes-perhaps five percent very 
low income, ten percent low income, twenty-five percent moder-
ate income, and the remainder middle income or above. These 
percentages need to be made more specific to parallel the per-
centage of the population accounted for by each of these groups. 
A goal for each cooperative might be to absorb a number of per-
sons from each income group roughly corresponding to the per-
centage of the population represented by each income group in 
the standard metropolitan statistical area in which the coopera-
tive was located. Rents could be paid by each tenant on a sliding 
scale according to income. Section 8 certificates or housing 
05. In addition, legislation may be required to relieve the landlord from an implied war-
ranty of habitability. Id. at 207. Such an alternative is advantageous both to the tenant 
and the landlord by allowing the tenant a stable housing payment schedule as well as 
giving the landlord the same security of having a rental income for an extended period of 
time._ 
273. Note the remarks of Representative Barney Frank (D. Mass.) regarding new 
housing assistance legislation: "It is extremely aggravating for us to sit here pitting one 
low income program against the other, particularly when you look at the money we're 
wasting on that stupid S.D.I. [Strategic Defense Initiative] program." Blakely, supra 
note 227, at 843. 
274. The I.R.S. has recently further restricted home mortgage interest deductions. 
Harney, Mortgage Rule Changes, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1987, at E4, col. 1, E5, col. 1. 
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vouchers could make up the difference between thirty percent of 
the tenant's rent and the contract rent at the cooperative. 
The cooperatives could be apartment buildings, public hous-
ing projects, renovated factories, vacant schools, or collections of 
single family homes. They could be in urban or rural areas; they 
could be new construction or existing housing (brought up to 
certain minimum standards by rehabilitation, if necessary). Re-
habilitation and new construction would be financed partially by 
the thirty-one billion dollar tax subsidy, partly by low income 
housing credits2711 and partly by mortgage revenue bonds.276 Us-
ing tax-foreclosure and federal mortgage-foreclosure properties, 
the subsidy of low income units by middle income renters (al-
ready in practice in such states as New Jersey),277 mortgage rev-
enue bonds,278 and low income housing credits,279 and eliminat-
ing costly owner-occupied housing, the real price of housing 
could decrease for all Americans. 
For those present owners who wish to own property regardless 
of the tax consequences, this proposal should allow them the ad-
vantages of an interest in their homes-a long-term lease with a 
cooperative, with representation on the cooperative's board-at 
a lower monthly after-tax payment than their present monthly 
mortgage note. The solution presented, of course, is not "social-
ism" in any form, but rather private, cooperative ownership.280 
In addition, the benefits possible as a result of "mainstreaming" 
low and moderate income families-in terms of lessened social 
275. Low income housing credits are provided by I.R.C. § 42 (1986). See also Calli-
son, supra note 118, at 100. See generally Sanders & Roady, How the New Tax Law 
Changes the Operating Rules for Real Estate Investments, 62 J. TAX'N 22 (1985). 
276. In keeping with this approach, the savings and loan industry would be gradually 
phased out and pension funds, insurance companies, corporations, and state and local 
governments would take its place as the principal source of nonfederal funds for financ-
ing the development of mixed income, multifamily housing development. See Peirce, 
supra note 262, at Fll, col. 2 (attractive financial packages are created by blending be-
low market rate loans, state subsidies, support of investors, community development 
funds, backing by such intermediaries as Rouse's Enterprise Foundation, and cheap ac-
quisition of HUD, VA, or tax-foreclosed properties). 
277. McDougall, supra note 205, at 677. Note that such linkage and set-aside tech-
niques might be jeopardized under the Nollan decision. See supra notes 208-11 and ac-
companying text. 
278. For state use of tax-exempt financing, see Fernsler, supra note 197, at 429-34. 
See also Note, Municipal Bonds-North Carolina Enters Housing Market-In re Hous-
ing Bonds, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 931 (1983) (public purpose challenge to issuance of 
municipal revenue bonds for developing moderate income housing). 
279. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
280. The mutual housing association model, discussed supra note 270, is now being 
used in affluent communities such as Greenwich and Westport, Connecticut for the de-
velopment of "moderate" income housing (in such communities, the price of a new home 
is nearly $300,000). Hiegaard Interview, supra note 270. 
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disorder, reduced problems of school desegregation, and the 
like-could be substantial. 
D. Some Alternatives for Financing Affordable Housing 
It is important to bear in mind that none of the models 
sketched in the previous section are susceptible to universal ap-
plication. The sweat-equity project is only viable in low and 
moderate income communities in which significant community 
spirit, and probably a vital and long-standing community organ-
ization, are present. The local public housing and/or assisted 
project can only develop in areas where racial and ethnic polari-
zation is not severe, and/or where there is a very special type of 
civic and political leadership for the municipality as a whole and 
possibly for the state. 
Because of the diversity of models for the development of af-
fordable housing which are likely to emerge, it is best that the 
federal government provide long-term demand-side funding to 
shore up local supply-side initiatives,281 occasionally making spe-
cial supply-side grants to facilitate the development of these 
various alternatives in the localities to which they are best 
suited.282 A National Housing Trust Fund, modeled with the ex-
perience of the National Corporation for Housing Partnerships, 
the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation,283 and the Neigh-
borhood Development Demonstration Program,284 would be a 
useful vehicle through which to funnel such monies.2811 Perhaps a 
national competition could be instituted, in which funds would 
be allocated to the best demonstration projects in the first in-
281. See Nolon, supra note 22, at 275-82 (discussing housing allowances and cash 
transfer payments). 
282. Vouchers could be provided for moderate income persons, see Hoeflich & Mal-
loy, supra note 23, at 685-88, while section 8 subsidies could be provided to low income 
persons. Some changes in the federal tax system might also be in order. Id. at 688-89; see 
also Williams, supra note 271, at 3-56 (discussing voucher systems). 
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 8101 (1982); see also Miles, supra note 4, at 55-60. For a 
description of NRC, see supra note 270. 
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
285. HUD Assistant Secretary Robert Demery recently mentioned that he: 
envisions such a fund as the ultimate, long-term solution to spot shortages of 
rental housing and increasing the number of poor families receiving housing aid. 
Such a fund . . . would operate on the basis of a partnership between the federal 
and state/local governments. Funding would have to be off-budget, renewable 
and from a reliable source such as a fee or tax on property transfers. . . . A 
public/private board would oversee the fund. 
50th Anniuersary, supra note 132, at 10. 
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stance, in hope of stirring the creativity necessary to address the 
problem of affordable housing in its many dimensions.286 Here 
the experience of Urban Development Action Grants287 and 
Housing Development Action Grants288 could provide useful 
guidance. 289 In the alternative, the financing program could be 
modeled after the Community Development Block Grant Pro-
gram, basically adopting the CDBG formula for distribution of 
funds. 290 
In the area of market rate housing, sufficient funds would 
have to be voted to enable the FHLBB to close financially ailing 
S & L's. It is apparent that the funds approved by the new 
FSLIC Recapitalization law are insufficient to achieve this objec-
tive. Healthy S & L's would be deregulated and required to 
merge with the FDIC, and the FSLIC would be closed. Future 
financing for market rate housing would be confined to federal 
income tax deductions for cooperative mortgage interest pay-
ments, grants authorized to mixed income multifamily develop-
ments through the Housing Trust Fund, and secondary mort-
gage market activity by the FNMA and the FHLMC. The 
GNMA might also have a role to play in selling mortgages used 
to finance some of the projects described in Section IV(B), 
above.291 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD HOUSING AS A SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The cost of capital for financing home ownership and for de-
veloping multifamily rental housing remains a significant prob-
lem that limits private, community, and government options for 
286. Peirce, supra note 262, at Fll, col. 1. The objective here would be to subsidize 
an experiment in order to encourage its duplication, but not overfund it so that money 
takes the place of the initiative upon which the project was based. It is a delicate bal-
ance. Keyes Interview, supra note 260. 
287. See Ellison, The Urban Development Action Grant Programs: Using Federal 
Funds to Leverage Private Investment in Distressed Communities, 11 URB. LAW. 424, 
424-28 (1979). 
288. See Nolon, supra note 22, at 257-74. 
289. See generally Hoeflich & Malloy, supra note 23, at 684-85 (discussing federal 
coordination of national housing policy). 
290. A proposed bill along these lines is presently being drafted for submission to the 
Senate Banking and Urban Affairs Committee by the National Low Income Housing 
Coalition. 
291. For an interesting proposal regarding the involvement of the GNMA, see Mazer 
& Clancy, GNMA Collateralized Municipal Bonds-A Community Development Tool 
for the Future, 11 URB. LAW. 416, 416-23 (1979). 
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developing affordable housing. Nonetheless, federal, state, and 
local government, and voluntary community organizations still 
have important roles to play in facilitating the development of 
affordable housing for all segments of the population. Because of 
budget cuts and a decline in the international competitiveness of 
our economy, the federal government is unlikely to be able to do 
very much without drastically cutting defense spending or rais-
ing taxes. Defense spending is a function of cultural imperatives 
and the world balance of peace; taxes, once lowered, are unlikely 
to be raised again. Tax revenues to subsidize the development of 
low and moderate income housing could be generated, however, 
by eliminating the deduction for home mortgage interest pay-
ments, thus discouraging private home ownership, a wasteful use 
of social capital. This subsidy is larger than the cost of all other 
housing programs, including public housing, combined. Perhaps 
a transition provision could subsidize the homeowner's transi-
tion to the rental or cooperative market. 
At the local level, the consequent rise in demand for coopera-
tive and rental apartments among middle class persons leaving 
home ownership could be used to drive "linkage" and "set-
aside" programs that would provide a certain minimum percent-
age of low and moderate income units in each new or substan-
tially rehabilitated middle class multifamily building. Such re-
quirements could also moderate trends toward wholesale 
displacement of less affluent persons when erstwhile home own-
ers flood the rental market. States could facilitate this process 
by explicitly adopting legislation authorizing linkage techniques, 
and by providing housing mortgage finance funds to subsidize 
the development of new mixed income rental facilities. These 
funds could be generated from the sale of mortgage revenue 
bonds, the interest from which would remain tax deductible. 
Community organizations might have a role to play in housing 
development strictly for low and moderate income people, 
though "mainstreaming" of these groups through linkage and 
set-aside programs is much to be preferred. Perhaps those orga-
nizations that have developed capability in producing low and 
moderate income housing could form joint-ventures with market 
rate builders to develop mixed income projects, lending their 
special expertise. Another important role for community organi-
zations is on the demand side of the housing equation. Commu-
nity organizations can make a real difference by engaging in eco-
nomic and community development that raises the real and 
effective incomes of low and moderate income persons, not only 
by providing jobs but also by providing low cost, subsidized ser-
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vices such as day care, transportation, health care, and assis-
tance in public school curricula and instruction. 
Although housing is local, and housing markets are local, pol-
icy coordination at the national level is still necessary, if only to 
even out the differences in resources and responses of the vari-
ous states. The challenge to federal policy is to draft housing 
legislation that is flexible enough to allow a variety of models to 
flourish but strict enough to ensure that each state and commu-
nity makes a real commitment to the development of affordable 
housing. The themes sketched in this section of the Article-a 
diversity of supply-side programs, coupled with federal subsidies 
on the demand side-are likely to be some of the themes pur-
sued in any new legislation. Still to be explored are the relations 
between the problems of affordable housing and the welfare sys-
tem on the one hand, and the tax system on the other. One im-
portant initiative may be for the staffs of the tax, housing, and 
human resources committees in both the Senate and the House 
to begin a dialogue with one another, to identify areas of overlap 
and areas of possible cooperation. 292 
Regardless of changes in political direction and administration 
that may occur on the national level, an important lesson of the 
Reagan years is the significant role that state and local govern-
ments and voluntary organizations can play in the development 
of affordable housing. The problem of affordable housing has a 
national as well as a local dimension, but it is the local level at 
which many of the most intractable aspects of the prob-
lem-problems of building and infrastructure deterioration, 
class and ethnic antagonism, and wasteful, exploitative practices 
of public and private institutions-are confronted. The local 
level properly remains the focus, even if a change in national 
administrations should make that a matter of choice rather than 
necessity. 
292. Keyes Interview, supra note 260. 
